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Comparing and Understanding Legal Aid Priorities: a Paper
Prepared for Legal Aid Ontario*
Mary Jane Mossman* with Karen Schucher + & Claudia
Schmeing

ABSTRACT
This paper explores different ways of defining legal aid priorities. In doing so,
the paper examines how ideas about access to justice have been implemented in
Ontario's judicare and community clinic systems, reviews developments in other
jurisdictions, and the requirements of Charter values. The paper also situates
priority-setting within the administration of justice, the literature about legal needs
and social exclusion, and the role of LAO as a state agency to ensure access to justice
for the poor and disadvantaged. Finally, the paper assesses the limits of the "legal
categories" approach and the "legal needs / social exclusion" approach, and
recommends defining legal aid priorities using a "social inclusion / systemic"
approach, as pioneered by community clinics.

RESUME
Ce document explore les differentes faqons de definir les priorits de l'aide
juridique. Enfaisant cela, ilexamine de quelle mani~re les idles sur 1'accs au droit
et i lajustice ont 6t implkmentes dans les systdmes des cliniques communautaires
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et l'aide juridique dans l'Ontario. Ce document met en revue les dkveloppements
dans les autresprovinces ainsi que les exigences des valeurs consacr&s g la Charte.
Ce papier met aussi en avant l' tablissement des priorit&dans l'administrationde la
justice, la litterature concernant les besoins juridiquespour les personnes pauvres.
Pour conclure, le document mentionne les limites des "categories juridiques",
lapproche en "besoins juridiques/exclusion sociale et, suggdre de definir les
priorit& de l'aide juridique en utilisant une approche d'inclusion
sociale/syst~matique,ouvert par des cliniques communautaires.

PART I: INTRODUCTION
1. OVERVIEW
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to discussions about priorities for legal
aid in Ontario. The paper explores methods of comparing and understanding different
approaches to legal aid priorities. Following this Introduction in Part I, the paper
includes three Parts:
PART II: Contexts for Legal Aid Priorities
The paper first situates issues about legal aid priorities within legal and social
contexts in Ontario. These issues include an understanding of the evolution of legal
aid in Ontario as part of access to justice movements; a review of recent experiences
in other jurisdictions with respect to priorities for legal aid; and an assessment of how
Charterrights, and Charter values, may affect definitions of priorities.
PART III: Goals for Legal Aid Priorities
In Part III, the paper reflects on relationships between the justice system and
legal aid priorities, and how changes in the administration of justice may impact the
provision of legal aid. In this context, the paper also reviews concepts of "legal
needs" and "justiciable problems", and situates these concepts within broader policy
and political contexts that affect legal aid priorities. Finally, the paper examines the
leadership role required of LAO in promoting access to justice goals.
PART IV: Approaches to Legal Aid Priorities
In Part IV, the paper examines three approaches to legal aid priorities: the "legal
categories" approach, the "legal needs / social exclusion" approach; and the "social
inclusion / systemic" approach. The paper assesses the advantages and disadvantages
of these differing approaches, and explores their application to some current issues in
relation to legal aid in Ontario. The paper also suggests directions for continuing
research and evaluation.
Overall, the paper reflects the view of the Report of the Ontario Legal Aid
Review that "the problem of priority-setting for legal aid in the context of fixed
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resources requires consideration of some fundamental questions of public policy";
involved in current and future efforts
these are the "hard choices" that are necessarily
1
Ontario.
in
aid
legal
for
priorities
to define
2. THE BACKGROUND FOR DEFINING LEGAL AID PRIORITIES
This paper reflects the new legal aid context in Ontario, introduced by the shift
in the 1990s, from governance by the Law Society of Upper Canada and "open-ended
funding" for statutorily-defined legal aid services, to the establishment of Legal Aid
Ontario and "capped annual budgets".
In this context, the 1997 Blueprint report examined principles concerning state
obligations to fund legal aid in the context of the rule of law, as well as the impact of
fundamental obligations to provide legal aid services created by the Charter,
statutory provisions, and international law. 2 The report then identified a series of
factors to be taken into account in determining priorities for the legal aid system as a
whole:
I. the importance of consultation in defining needs and of
responding to a broad range of needs;
II. strategic oversight at a system-wide level with
responsiveness to local conditions;
III. limitation of the impact of the "negative liberty" test;
IV. the need to integrate delivery model issues into the prioritysetting process and to focus on client impact;
V. the strategic use of resources to facilitate access to law; and
VI. the need to monitor and revise priorities in an "evolving
social and legal environment" .3
At the outset, it is important to note that this paper reflects the Blueprint report's
recommendation that priorities be created for "the entire legal aid system" in
Ontario. 4 However, in doing so, it is necessary to acknowledge two different
traditions in the history of Ontario legal aid. In relation to judicare services, priorities
for legal aid services were originally established by statute and regulations, and these
services were "open-ended" until they became subject to annual budgets when LAO
1 See , Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario Legal Aid Review, Report of the Ontario
Legal Aid Review. a blueprintforpubliclyfundedlegal services (Toronto: 1997) at 67
[Blueprint report]; J. Douglas Ewart, "Hard Caps; Hard Choices: A Systemic Model for Legal
Aid" in Frederick H. Zemans, Patrick J, Monahan & Aneurin Thomas, eds., A New Legal Aid
Planfor Ontario:BackgroundPapers (North York: York University Centre for Public Law
and Public Policy, 1997) 7.
2Blueprintreport, ibid.
3 Ibid at 90.
4 Ibid at 88-90.
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was established. By contrast, community legal clinics have always been funded in
accordance with fixed annual budgets, ever since they were included as part of
Ontario legal aid in the 1970s. Indeed, the Blueprint report noted that clinics "have
[always] had
to adjust their service level and service mix to accommodate fluctuating
5
demand."
In this context, the Blueprint report recommended that the Board of Legal Aid
Ontario assume responsibility for creating cyclical strategic plans and for
determining legal aid priorities, taking into account the requirements of the rule of
law, for the overall legal aid program.6 This paper thus explores options for
determining overall priorities for legal aid in the context of Ontario's justice system.
This paper benefited from access to the recently-released Report of the Legal
Aid Review 2008. 7 In addition, it considers a number of the report's specific
recommendations. At the outset, however, it is important to note some aspects of the
Trebilcock Report that are reflected in this paper:
First, the Trebilcock Report adopts a conception of legal aid as an integral part
of the overall justice system, and allocates to Legal Aid Ontario a significant and
proactive role in improving access to justice for vulnerable individuals in Ontario.
Both these issues are significant for the assessment of legal aid priorities in this
paper.
Second, the Trebilcock Report recommends broadening legal aid services to
provide information about law to the larger community without means-testing. This
recommendation is designed to create wider support for legal aid services among
middle class taxpayers. As will be illustrated, this paper supports the need for broader
access to information about law and legal processes; however, it differs on issues of
implementation in relation to this work with respect to the role of community legal
clinics.
Third, the Trebilcock Report recommends better integration of legal aid
services, and of legal and social services, with the goal of achieving holistic services
for clients. This paper recommends more detailed attention to current initiatives in
community legal clinics in promoting these goals.
In addition, this paper argues that there is a need to envisage legal aid in broader
terms than "services" to individual clients, as documented in the Trebilcock Report.
More specifically, this paper links the work of community legal clinics with
traditional and ongoing efforts to utilize legal aid as a strategy for confronting
systemic barriers to equality in Ontario. Thus, in reflecting on approaches to legal aid
priorities, this paper seeks to connect traditional roles of community legal clinics with
current proposals for more holistic legal aid services, which can better address
5 Ibid

at 87.
6Ibid at 256.
7 Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the LegalAid Review 2008 (Toronto:
Ministry of the Attorney General, 2008) [Trebilcock Report] (report submitted to the
Honourable Chris Bentley, Attorney General of Ontario).
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systemic (rather than just individualized) problems in the lives of those who are the
poorest and most vulnerable members of our community.
Overall, this paper conceptualizes legal aid services as both holistic and
transformative, and offers ways of rethinking the provision of legal aid to achieve
these goals. In doing so, the paper seeks to provide a basis for discussion and debate
about the role of legal aid and of Legal Aid Ontario in the overall context of the
justice system in Ontario.
3. DETAILED ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
Part II: Contexts for Defining Legal Aid Priorities
Part II of this paper explores ideas about legal aid priorities by taking account of
three contexts that shape legal aid programs in Ontario:
1. The paper first situates current legal aid arrangements within the broader
movements of access to justice in Canada and elsewhere, and identifies themes that
have characterized the evolution of legal aid in Ontario, some of which may need to
be addressed in efforts to define current and future legal aid priorities.
2. The paper then provides a brief review of recent developments in other
similar jurisdictions, where policies of governmental restraint have also necessitated
cutbacks in legal aid and other services of the welfare state in recent decades. It also
reviews strategies adopted and debated in the United States, Australia, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom, with a brief report on developments in western Europe, and
uses these developments in its assessment of approaches to legal aid priorities.
3. The final section of this Part offers a brief assessment of legal requirements
created by the Charter, by Canadian statutes and by international law norms with
respect to legal aid priorities. The paper argues that Charter values, and not only
Charterrights, may need to be considered in defining legal aid priorities.
Part III: Goals for Legal Aid Priorities
Part III of this paper focuses on goals for legal aid priorities:
1. The first section of this Part situates legal aid within systems of law and
justice, and examines how overall contexts for legal services and the justice system
shape the role of legal aid. For example, the impact of complex statutory regimes
involving individual rights and procedures that may necessitate expert advice, the
degree to which activities are subject to criminal regulation, the growth of a variety
of venues and processes for resolving disputes, the impact of discourses of
privatization and "responsabilization", the expansion of the range of providers of
legal services and their markets, and governmental demands for accountability and
limitations on expenditures, may all constitute factors that necessitate (changing)
needs for access to legal aid. In this way, one goal for legal aid is to serve the overall
justice system effectively.
2. The second section assesses the goals of "legal needs" in relation to recent
research concerning "justiciable problems", and ideas of "social exclusion" and
"social inclusion". The paper argues that these concepts must be understood in terms

154

Windsor Review of Legal and SocialIssues

Vol. 29

of political choices about legal aid priorities, and that it is necessary to be attentive to
the ways that legal discourse both reflects and shapes ideas about the role of the state
in the provision of legal services to individuals and communities. In this context,
legal aid priorities must be attentive to these concepts and their political goals within
the administration of justice.
3. Finally, the last section of this Part addresses the role of Legal Aid Ontario, as
a state actor with primary responsibility for promoting access to justice for vulnerable
individuals and communities in Ontario. It also emphasizes how goals of innovation
and responsiveness to communities require that governmental programs for legal aid
be designed to confront systemic problems of inequality. Furthermore, it suggests a
need for ongoing monitoring and experimentation in defining priorities and in
designing delivery systems for legal aid.
Part IV: Comparing and Understanding Legal Aid Priorities
Part IV explores three broad approaches to defining legal aid priorities: (1) the
"legal categories" approach; (2) the "legal needs / social exclusion" approach; and
(3) the "social inclusion / systemic" approach.
In assessing how each of these approaches shapes the content of legal aid
services and achieves particular goals, this paper offers some current examples for
implementing these approaches, and makes suggestions about further research and
evaluation for LAO.
Overall, the paper's goal is to encourage discussion and debate about the nature
of legal aid in Ontario as an integral part of the justice system, and to identify
proactive measures to enable Legal Aid Ontario to make these goals effective in
practice.
In accordance with the Terms of Reference, the paper was initially prepared by
reviewing a wide range of literature in Canada and in other jurisdictions, including
academic books and articles as well as government documents, task force and legal
aid reports, and relevant cases and statutes. This revised Paper benefited from
consultation with staff at LAO and others involved in legal aid in January 2009, brief
consultations in Australia in March 2009, and the opportunity to review papers
presented at the April 2009 meeting of the International Legal Aid Group in New
Zealand.

PART II CONTEXTS FOR DEFINING LEGAL AID PRIORITIES
1. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND LEGAL AID IN ONTARIO
"Access to Justice": Legal Aid and "Waves" of Access to Justice
[W]hile the term "access to justice" has been used mainly in relation
to the legal system, the "justice" to which it refers has been taken by

Vol. 29

Comparing and Understanding Legal Aid Priorities

155

reformers to mean much more than legal justice. The history of the
access to justice movement can be read as an ongoing struggle to
overcome the discrepancy between the claims of substantivejustice
and the formal legal system. The term has been useful precisely
because it signifies this tension between legaljustice and substantive
justice. The first wave of access to justice reform focused on
increasing the availability of formal legal means of access to justice
8
by increasing access to lawyers' services.
Christine Parker's formulation of the relationship between legal aid and access
to justice explains how legal aid was part of the "first wave" of access to justice
initiatives in the second half of the twentieth century. Parker's formulation is based
on the classic view of access to justice, defined by the Florence Access to Justice
Project in the 1970s, to include three "waves". 9 In reviewing their project later,
Cappelletti and Garth identified two basic purposes of the legal system: it must be
"equally accessible to all" and it must "lead to results that are individually and
socially just".to As the authors stated firmly, "a basic premise [is]11 that social justice,
as sought by our modem societies, presupposes effective access."
In responding to this need for effective access, Cappelletti and Garth identified
three waves of reforms. The first wave introduced legal aid services; the second wave
included a group of reforms aimed at providing legal representation for "diffuse"
interests, especially in relation to consumer and environmental protections; and the
third wave constituted more comprehensive reforms, including changes in procedures
and the structures of courts (and the creation of new courts), the use of laypersons
and paraprofessionals, reforms of substantive laws to avoid disputes or facilitate their
resolution, and the use of private, informal dispute resolution processes. 12 As
Cappelletti and Garth argued, these three waves sometimes overlap and intersect in

Christine Parker, Just Lawyers: Regulation andAccess to Justice (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999) at 31-32 [emphasis added].
8

9 Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, eds., Access to Justice, Vol. L A World Survey (Milan:
Dott. A. Giuffr Editore, 1978) Book II [Access to Justice I]; Mauro Cappelletti & John
Weisner, eds., Access to Justice, Vol lI: PromisingInstitutions (Milan: Dott. A. Giuffi&

Editore, 1978) Book I [Access to JusticeI]]; Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, eds., Access
to Justice Vol III: Emerging Issues andPerspectives (Milan: Dott. A. Giuffr' Editore, 1979)
[Access to Justice III]; Klaus-Friedrich Koch, ed., Access to Justice Vol. IV. The
AnthropologicalPerspective (Milan: Dott. A. Giuffr Editore, 1979) [Access to Justice IV].

'0 Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, "Access to Justice: the Newest Wave in the Worldwide
Movement to Make Rights Effective" (1977-1978) 27 Buff. L. Rev. 181 at 182.
" Ibid [emphasis in original].
12 Mary Jane Mossman & Heather Ritchie, "Access to Civil Justice: A Review of Canadian
Legal Academic Scholarship 1977-1987" in Allan C. Hutchinson, ed., Access to Civil Justice
(Toronto: Carswell, 1990) 53 at 61-63; See also Cappelletti & Garth, Access to Justice I,
supra note 9 at 209.
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different ways, but together, they represent a range of different kinds of initiatives
that may accomplish the goal of increasing access to justice.
Two features of the goals identified by Cappelletti and Garth are relevant to this
paper's assessment of legal aid priorities. One is that the "legal aid" approach to
access to justice ("first wave") necessitates a large cadre of lawyers who must be
funded by the state to provide services to those who are unable to pay for them; as a
result, it is less likely that "uneconomic" small claims will be funded, even though
they may be of some significance to individual clients, and it may also prove more
complicated to provide representation for "diffuse" group (community) interests, by
contrast with individual claims. 13
Second, Cappelletti and Garth suggested that the full panoply of access to justice
initiatives should accomplish more than cosmetic changes by producing "beneficial14
changes in the day-to-day lives of the groups for whom the rights were created."'
Clearly, the authors understood access to justice goals in terms of substantive, not
merely procedural, outcomes. Significantly, they also recognized that their approach
necessitates political choices, arguing that "[a]ccess to justice necessarily implicates
issues central to the politics of the modern welfare state."' 15 This insight reveals how
political choices are necessarily involved in defining priorities for legal aid services.
More recently, Parker attempted to link recent efforts to reform the legal
profession with these evolving concepts of access to justice. As she noted, although
the term "access to justice" has focused mainly on the legal system, "the 'justice' to6
which it refers has been taken by reformers to mean much more than legal justice."'
In this context, because "people do see the legal profession as a major access to
justice institution", Parker argued that much access to justice policy "relies either
on reorganizing institutions of legal professionalism and legal
directly or indirectly
17
delivery."
service
Parker focused on the "three waves" of access to justice reforms to assess their
current advantages and disadvantages. In relation to legal aid, for example, she
suggested a close connection between arrangements for legal aid services and the
"enlightened self-interest" of solicitors and barristers, for whom the provision of such
services offers regular fees. Thus, she concluded that although legal aid has improved
access for some clients, "it has only marginally changed the ways legal services are
provided and the legal system works."' 18 Moreover, she agreed with Cappelletti and
Garth that legal aid can never address many "everyday injustices" for which
professional assistance is economically inefficient. Yet, even with respect to "second
wave" and "third wave" reforms, Parker concluded that the radical potential of new
13 Mossman, ibid. at 62-63, 65.

Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, "Access to Justice as a Focus of Research" (1981) 1
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. ix at xiv.
14Mauro

15 Ibid. at xvi.
16 Parker, supra note 8 at 31.
"7Ibid

18Ibid at 34 (citing Roger Smith, director of the English Legal Action Group).
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forums, new sources of law, and different ways of promoting self-empowerment
were often undermined in practice, both by governments interested primarily in
containing costs and by lawyers who tend to "colonize" them. 19
In the end, Parker recommended the adaptation of existing ideas of
to
create responsive access to20justice initiatives
neighbourhood justice
... arrangements
.
.
...
within powerful organizations (including globalized corporations). Significantly, by
shifting some justice claims to these other sites, she argued that state resources could
be directed not only to the infrastructure of formal justice in the courts, but also target
those who "suffer domination in non-institutional settings", particularly women and
"the smallest, yet most ubiquitously powerful unit in postchildren within families,
21
societies".
industrial
Parker's assessment is thus relevant to this paper's concerns about legal aid
priorities because the problems of women and children in families should be "the
priorityfor state access to justice spending."' 22 In addition to identifying family
problems as a priority for legal aid, Parker's analysis is significant because it links
access to justice reforms to the need for changes in the provision of services by the
legal profession and in court processes.
In the Canadian context, Roderick Macdonald's scholarly work on access to
justice in Canada offers a detailed and comprehensive assessment of five "waves;"
although his first three correspond broadly to those of the FlorenceAccess to Justice
Project.23 In addition, he identified a fourth wave involving increased efforts at
9Ibid at 37-38 (significantly, Parker identified a new "fourth wave" of access to justice
reforms which began to appear in the 1980s and 1990s, although often without the access to
justice label: competition policies that were designed to allocate access to justice resources,
both formal and informal, as efficiently as possible through market institutions; she
documents how the introduction of less restrictive advertising policies by law societies, as
well as the elimination of lawyers' monopoly on conveyancing, resulted in lower fees for
some legal services in a number of common law jurisdictions in recent decades; however, as
Parker acknowledged, these "fourth wave" reforms are more likely to increase access to
justice goals for middle-class persons with some discretionary resources to allocate to legal
services, or to commercial litigants; they are unlikely to be of any assistance to the poor:
"those without discretionary resources will be excluded from the market and therefore from
participation in the legal system" at 41); See also David M. Trubek, "Critical Moments in
Access to Justice Theory: The Quest for the Empowered Self' in Allan C. Hutchinson, ed.,
Access to CivilJustice(Toronto: Carswell, 1990) 107 at 122; Sally Engle Merry, "Sorting out
Popular Justice" in Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner, eds., The Possibility of PopularJustice:
A CaseStudy of Community Mediation in the United States (Ann Arbor: The University of

Michigan Press, 1993.) 3 1.
20 Parker, ibid at 174-175, 185.
21 Ibid at 192.
22 Ibid [emphasis added].
23 Roderick A. Macdonald, "Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Scale, and
Ambitions" in Julia Bass, W.A. Bogart & Frederick H. Zemans, eds., Access to Justicefor a
New Century - The Way Forward(Toronto: The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) 19.

[Macdonald, "Scope, Scale, and Ambitions"]; See also Roderick A. Macdonald, "Theses on
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preventative law and citizen participation in governmental decision-making and a
fifth wave of initiatives that have fostered more equal access to positions of authority
within the legal system. 24 Macdonald also emphasized the challenges of increasingly
diverse populations, globalization, and new patterns in personal relationships. 25 In
strategy and efforts to ensure
this context, he recommended .a multi-dimensional
•
26
access to justice in non-state institutions. In addition, he identified target groups for
whom access to justice is particularly significant, including persons who experience
economic disadvantage, who are unrepresented in the civil justice system, who are
stigmatized by criminal records,27and who suffer disabilities or health problems or the
impact of psychological trauma.
Macdonald also focused on legal aid as one strategy for achieving access to
justice; like the Trebilcock Report, he also considered other strategies, including
changes in legal fees, the use of alternative service providers for some legal services,
the role of legal insurance, the use of subsidies and contingency fee arrangements,
changes in the structural cost of litigation and government services, ADR and
alternatives to courts. 28 Significantly, both Macdonald and the Trebilcock Report
concluded that issues about access to justice are closely connected to other issues of
inequality in Canadian society; as Macdonald argued, a lack of access to justice is
just a symptom of a larger set of issues for many citizens: medical, social and
economic. Thus, he concluded that "[i]mproving the socio-economic situation of
many Canadians by focusing on issues of social justice and the distribution of social
power in Canada today, may2 9 be a self-correcting creative approach to everyday
problems of access to justice."
Macdonald's analysis is important to assessing priorities for legal aid in three
ways. First, Macdonald envisages legal aid as an integral part of access to justice
goals, and as clearly linked to other strategies designed to meet these goals; in this
context, any process of defining priorities for legal aid must take account of these
broader goals. Second, Macdonald recognizes that some Canadians may experience a
lack of access to justice that is linked to problems of social justice and socioeconomic status. In this way, his analysis connects ideas about access to justice and
concepts of "social exclusion". Finally, by recognizing the need for access to justice
to include participation in law creation and administration, Macdonald's vision of

Access to Justice" (1992) 7:2 C.J.L.S. 23; "Roderick A. Macdonald, "Whose Access? Which
Justice?" (1992) 7:1 C.J.L.S. 175; Roderick A. Macdonald, "Access to Justice and Law
Reform" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 287; Roderick A. Macdonald, "Access to
Justice and Law Reform #2" (2001) 19 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 317.
24 Macdonald, "Scope, Scale, and Ambitions", ibid,at 23.
25 Ibid at 19.
26 Ibid. at 23-26.
27
Ibid. at 26-31.
28 Ibid at 33-85.
29 Ibid. at 102; See also ibid at 101, 107.
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access to justice (re)defines the "quest for justice through law" in terms of democratic
values and social citizenship.
ONTARIO LEGAL AID: SIGNIFICANT THEMES IN ITS EVOLUTION

In the context of these access to justice ideas, it is important to conceptualize
legal aid in terms of broader legal and social goals. Yet, it has often been argued that
legal aid services, as "first wave" services only, offer no challenge to the status quo;
as David Trubek concluded, for example, "[l]egal aid simply reassured us that the
distribution of income was30 not a threat to the classical liberal's vision of selfempowerment through law.
However, this assertion may need to be qualified in relation to the history of
legal aid in Ontario. Although some features of legal aid programs may have
reflected the limits of the "first wave" of access to justice, other aspects reveal
aspirations to larger goals of social justice. That is, while some legal aid services
were designed primarily to offer representation in the courts in matters for which
lawyers generally offer services to paying clients (judicare services); community
legal clinics in Ontario were expressly designed to provide specialized services for
poor and disadvantaged clients, and to use legal strategies to confront systemic
barriers to equality and democraticparticipationfor vulnerable communities. In this
way, while Trubek's criticism might apply to judicare services, it is arguable that
community legal clinics were established with different goals, including the goal of
challenging the status quo.
Two aspects about comparing and understanding legal aid priorities are
particularly relevant to this history of Ontario legal aid services. One is that current
challenges with respect to defining legal aid priorities must be understood as a
continuity within Ontario's legal aid program; in particular, the experiences of
community clinics in defining, monitoring and revising legal aid priorities provide a
major (and perhaps largely untapped) resource for identifying the most significant
legal problems for legal aid clients. Second, the history of legal aid in Ontario clearly
reveals that legal aid has been designed not only to provide equality of access before
courts and tribunals (access to law), but that it has also aspired to goals of social
justice and transformationwithin poor communities. Thus, the brief history of legal
aid in Ontario, which follows, provides an important institutional background for
current LAO work, as well as concrete examples of aspirations for social justice
within the tradition of priorities for legal aid in Ontario.
The Legal Aid Act of 1966 established the certificate system for legal aid
services in Ontario, based on recommendations of the Joint Committee Report. The
Joint Committee included representatives of the Attorney General and the Law
Society. The Joint Committee expressly concluded that "legal aid should form part of

30

Trubek, supra note 19 at 115.
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justice in its broadest sense", and that it was "no longer a
the administration 3of
1
right.",
a
but
charity
The Joint Committee also expressed its conclusion that the "prime responsibility
for the cost of legal aid" belonged to the government. 32 From a contemporary
perspective, the Joint Committee's recommendations reveal how legal aid services
were conceptualized as providing "access to law", that is, as a fundamental service of
the liberal state. 33 In this context, the range of services offered to indigent clients was
little recognition that "[p]oor
modelled on services available to paying clients, with
34
money."
without
people
rich
like
people are not just
Yet, at the same time, there is evidence in the Joint Committee Report that
services might need to be tailored to the particular circumstances of individual
clients. For example, in determining eligibility for legal aid in criminal matters, the
report recommended that "the groper test should be the gravity of a conviction in the
circumstances of the accused."
Similarly, the Report recommended that legal aid be available in family courts
to "level the balance where a wife ... is without means to retain counsel and her
husband ... appears with counsel [a typical and frequent occurrence, and noting that
such a situation] ... places the wife at a disadvantage and the Judge under a
disability." 36 In addition, the Report acknowledged the growing importance of
administrative tribunals which "exercise a large and increasing jurisdiction to deal
with the rights of individuals in Ontario", and concluded that there was "no logical
37
reason" to treat courts and tribunals differently with respect to access to legal aid.
These examples demonstrate that, even within a traditional judicare system,
based on legal categories of services available to paying clients, the Joint Committee
recognized the importance of taking account of the impact on the individual in
defining priorities for legal aid.
Almost a decade after the Joint Committee Report, the Attorney General
established another task force to examine legal aid. The Task Force on Legal Aid
began by commending the legal aid program in Ontario for contributing to the goal of
31

Ontario, The Joint Committee on Legal Aid, Province of Ontario:Report of the Joint

Committee on Legal Aid (Toronto: The Joint Committee on Legal Aid, 1965) at 97 [Joint
Committee Report] (the Joint Committee investigated legal aid services in other provinces of
Canada and in other jurisdictions, but it appears that they were guided in particular by the
legal aid scheme adopted in England on the basis of recommendations by the Rushcliffe
Committee in 1949); See Maureen Spencer, "Public subsidies without strings - Labour and
the lawyers at the birth of legal aid" (2002) 9:3 InternationalJournalof the Legal Profession
251 (provides an account of the origins of legal aid in the United Kingdom).
32 Ibid. at 98.
33 Trubek, supra note 19 at 115.
34 Stephen Wexler, "Practicing Law for Poor People" (1970) 79:5 Yale L.J. 1049.
35 Joint Committee Report, supra note 31 at 61.

36 Ibid. at 59 (the report noted that some lawyers refused to provide legal aid services under
the voluntary system, believing that most requests for divorce constituted a "luxury" at 64).
37 Ibid. at 58.
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equality before the law. 38 However, by contrast with the Joint Committee Report, the
of "gaps" in legal aid services: the need for legal
a number ,4
Osler •Report
• ,
39
•identified
advice; advice in "small claims ; problems of increasing legislation enacted as a
41
result of social and economic changes and that particularly affected the poor;
•.• 42 the
need to foster values of community consultation and democratic participation; and
problems of geographical and cultural inaccessibility of legal services.4 3 In
responding to these "gaps" in services, the Osler Report recommended flexibility in
the delivery of a broad range of legal aid services to different communities across
Ontario4 to "remedy the chronic under-utilization of the profession and the law by the
4
poor."
Significantly, in its recommendations for legal aid services, the Osler Report
focused on the particular needs of poor clients.
[These needs include] the fact that they are more often responding to
legal problems rather than initiating claims, the problem that many of
38

Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Task Force on Legal.Aid Part]

(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1974) at 17 (Chair: The Hon. Mr. Justice John H.
[Osler Report].
Osler)
39
Ibid. at 18-19 ("Preventive law, in the sense of timely advice, the careful drafting of
necessary protective documents and merely the simple process of advising individuals of the
is the area in which most people ...
existence of rules of law applicable to their situation ...
often").
most
and
assistance
require
advice
40
Ibid. at 19 ("[I]t may frequently take a great deal of time, and hence money, to decide and
advise a poor man upon rights that may exist under legislation or private contract relating to
employment, housing, welfare or other social benefits vitally important to the poor man but
small in terms of absolute dollars").
41Ibid. (the Report noted an "unprecedented" scale of social and economic changes that were
also reflected in law, including the enactment of legislation concerning consumer rights,
relationships of landlord and tenant, social benefits, economic and other anti-discrimination
rules, immigration matters, civil rights, workmen's (sic) compensation. Moreover, in spite of
its generic terms, "a very high proportion of it affects the poor person more directly and
[and] more and more of these detailed
intrinsically than a person of means or affluence ...
regulations affect the individual and particularly the poor individual, at his work and in his
life").
42 Ibid. at 20-21 (the Report also noted how the increasing recognition of citizens in regulating
their own affairs had become "part of the fabric of our society." As a result, there was an
increasing need to assist groups and communities to engage in consultation in relation to
matters affecting them. Thus, "[t]he wide range of professional services that lawyers have
traditionally provided to their clients is expected to be provided to the poor as well as the rich.
The concept of Legal Aid as 'litigation' is now clearly seen as inadequate" at 21).
43 Ibid. at 21 (the Report also documented the inaccessibility of private lawyers' offices, often
located in downtown settings far from clients' homes and workplaces; as well as lack of
information about legal aid services).
44 Ibid. at 25 (Part 2 of the Report focused on legal aid needs in rural and aboriginal
communities).
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their claims involve only small amounts of money but may
nonetheless be critically important to them, the inappropriateness of
using the test of the "man of modest means" in determining whether
to
legal aid services are necessary for poor clients, and the need
45
services.
aid
legal
of
part
as
rights
legal
about
education
include
Moreover, the Osler Report used the language of "poverty law" to describe the
needs of poor clients for which traditional legal services were generally unavailable.
In this context, the Report recommended that the legal aid program establish and
fund neighbourhood legal aid clinics; however, it also envisaged that clinic Boards of
Directors would have authority to determine special priorities, while encouraging
them to give priority to the "gaps" that had been identified: "requests for legal advice
and representation and the development of
and assistance, community group advice
46
programmes."
education
community
Following the 1974 Osler Report, legal aid funding was extended to community
legal clinics, but when problems occurred in relation to these new funding
arrangements, the Attorney General again established an inquiry with respect to
"clinical funding". The 1978 Report of the Commission on Clinical Funding was
important to Ontario legal services, not only because it recommended community
clinics as an integral part of legal aid in the province, but also because it clearly
emphasized how "the clinics have brought the law and its remedies to countless
benefits." 47
citizens of this province who otherwise would never have known its
The result of the Commission's Report was a new Clinic Funding Regulation,
which confirmed the Report's assessment of the role of community legal clinics as an
essential part of the "mixed model" of legal aid services in Ontario.
However, the 1978 Report recognized several unique aspects of community
legal clinics. Unlike the legal aid certificate services established in 1966, community
clinic services were always funded based on annual funding allocations, and their
Boards were required to establish priorities for their services, to monitor the
provision of services, and to redefine priorities as necessary.
Clinics were not intended to extend to the poor the same services that were
available to paying clients; instead, the services offered by community clinics were
designed to meet the different needs of poor and vulnerable individuals, groups and
communities.
Finally, community clinics were not generally confined to litigation in courts,
but their mandates extended to advice and education services, representation before

41Ibid
46

Ibid at 54.

47 Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Commission on ClinicalFunding

(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1978) at 42 [Clinical Funding Report] (in relation
to the scope of legal aid clinics, the Report also recognized a need to define "community" as
including both geographical communities as well as communities of interest. at 12-13).
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tribunals, test case litigation, and law reform and community development strategies
48
on behalf of their clients, all designed to confront systemic problems of inequality.
SUMMARY
As this brief historical overview of legal aid in Ontario suggests, two themes are
relevant for this paper about comparing and understanding legal aid priorities.
One is that legal aid services in Ontario may not fall entirely within the
traditional "first wave" of access to justice initiatives. Particularly in relation to the
development of community legal clinics, legal aid programs in Ontario were intended
to extend beyond the provision of legal representation in the courts, and to embrace
some of the goals of "second" and "third wave" access to justice programs: group
and community actions; representation in a variety of settings other than courts; law
reform, legal advice and strategic legal actions to confront systemic barriers to access
to justice. In this context, there is considerable expertise in community clinics with
respect to poor clients and vulnerable communities and their "legal needs" and
"justiciable problems".
Second, the history of legal aid services in Ontario reveals that, well before the
"hard cap" on certificate services was introduced in the 1990s, community clinics
were engaged in priority setting for legal aid in the context of their fixed annual
budgets and the need to "join up" legal aid and other social services in
communities. 4 9 In this context, the experiences of community legal clinics offer
much useful data and experience with processes and strategies for defining overall
priorities for legal aid.
Thus, since "[o]ur concepts of social justice have never remained constant" 50 it
is important to understand current discussions about legal aid priorities as part of an
ongoing process for defining legal aid in Ontario; and that community legal clinics
have both longstanding expertise and valuable experience that is useful, perhaps even
critical, to this process.
2. OTHER JURISDICTIONS: LEGALAID CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES
[S]cholarly tensions and concerns have been heavily underlined by a
direct challenge to the level of state spending on legal and related
advice services across Western societies. This has led to a growing
interest in measures which enable greater control over expenditure,

48

Ibid at 15.
49 Ab Currie, "Justiciable Problems and Access to Justice in Canada" (Paper presented to the
International Legal Aid Group Conference, Antwerp, November 2007) at 9 [unpublished]
[emphasis added] ("The fact that problems are so frequent as to be nearly normal is more a
cause for concern than for dismissing them as merely the problems of everyday life").
50 Osler Report, supra note 38 at vii.
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of such
but also a wider ideological challenge to the desirability
51
funding, and the utility of lawyers more generally.
As this comment indicates, there are "tensions and concerns" about legal aid in
other western jurisdictions, many of them quite similar to those experienced in
Ontario in recent decades. 52 As governments have increasingly embraced neo-liberal
approaches to the provision of public services, moving away from the welfare state
commitment to universality and instead emphasizing the need to "target" services to
meet needs efficiently, budgetary allocations for legal aid have come under
increasing scrutiny. 53 As the Blueprint report suggested, the institution of a "capped"
budget for legal aid necessitated that "resources be directed to the most compelling
legal needs and that they be deployed in the most efficient manner possible"; in this
context, the report recognized that this goal required "prioritization of legal needs and
services." 54
a detailed analysis of the most cost-effective means of providing specific
As this comment reveals, defining priorities is closely connected to choices about
services and about service delivery.
In understanding and comparing approaches to defining priorities for legal aid,
this paper provides a brief overview of some recent developments in selected
common law jurisdictions: the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom; and more briefly in relation to western Europe. Some of these
developments are explored more fully in relation to the paper's later discussion of
different approaches to legal aid priorities.
UNITED STATES
Courts in the United States established a constitutional right to counsel for
indigent criminal defendants in a series of cases several decades ago, including the
well-known decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.55 However, in a study conducted by
the American Bar Association forty years later, Gideon's Broken Promise, "witnesses
documented deep-rooted problems in the delivery of indigent defence services,
establishing a clear and pressing need for reform." 56 Indeed, this 2004 ABA report

Moorhead & Pascoe Pleasence, "Access to Justice after Universalism:
Introduction" (2003) 30:1 J.L. & Soc'y at 1-2 [Moorhead & Pleasence, "Access to Justice"].
52 For a list of recent studies, task force reports and government documents, see the
Bibliography, Part II (on file with author).
51Richard

53Moorhead& Pleasence,

"Access to Justice", supra, note 51 at 2; See also Hilary

Sommerlad, "Some Reflections on the Relationship between Citizenship, Access to Justice,
and the Reform of Legal Aid" (2004) 31:3 J.L. & Soc'y 345.
54 Blueprintreport, supra note 1 at 172.
55 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct.792 (1963); See also Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932); Argersingerv. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006 (1972).
56 American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants,
"Gideon's Broken Promise: America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice: A Report on the

Vol. 29

Comparing and Understanding Legal Aid Priorities

165

concluded that indigent defence in the United States was in "a state of crisis", lacking
fundamental fairness and creating risks of wrongful conviction. 57
In addition to reviewing a number of promising reforms in several states, the
ABA identified ten principles of a public defence delivery system, including
measures to ensure the independence of the defence function and a variety of
procedures to avoid delay and to achieve quality of services. 58 These include
monitoring and control of caseloads, parity between defence counsel and prosecution
with respect to resources such as technology, research, investigators and access to
experts, and arrangements for supervision and quality control. 59 From the perspective
of legal aid in Ontario, these recommendations are of interest because services for
indigent criminal accused are matters of priority in most parts of the United States;
thus, the serious problems identified by the ABA with respect to the efficacy of
criminal legal aid warrant careful attention in assessing connections between
priorities and service delivery to accused persons in Ontario.
By contrast with the right to counsel for indigent accused, courts in the United
States have not recognized similar guarantees for civil claims, even where crucial
interests are at stake. According to the United States Supreme Court, the due process
clause requires appointment of counsel in civil cases only if the proceeding would
otherwise prove "fundamentally unfair"; in making this determination, courts must
consider the private interests at stake, the government's interest, and the risk that lack
of counsel will lead to erroneous decisions. According to Deborah Rhode, courts
in such a restrictive fashion that "counsel is almost
have tended to apply this test
' 61
never required in civil cases."
More recently, the 2007 Legal Services Corporation's report, Documenting the
Justice Gap in America, attempted to update earlier ABA studies of legal needs
studies published in 1994. 6 2 The 2007 report confirmed that, "[w]ith one exception,

American Bar Association's Hearings on the Right to Counsel in Criminal Proceedings"
(Chicago: American Bar Association, 2004) at 29 [Gideon's Broken Promise].
" Ibid. at 38.
58 Ibid at 41-45, Appendix II.
59 Ibid at Appendix B.
60 Lassiter v. Departmentof Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S.
18,
101 S.Ct. 2153 (1981).
61 Deborah Rhode,"Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice" (2003) 17:1 Geo.J.

Legal Ethics 369 at 375; See also Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, "State Statutes Providing for a
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases" (2006) 40 Clearinghouse Review Journal of Poverty Law
and Policy 245 at 248; Clare Pastore, "Life after Lassiter: An Overview of State-Court Rightto-Counsel Decisions" (July-Aug 2006) 40 Clearinghouse Review Journal of Poverty Law
and Policy 186; Bruce A. Boyer, "Justice, Access to Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel for
Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiterv. Departmentof Social Services of
Durham ", Case Comment, (2004) 36:1 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 363.
62 Legal Services Corporation, Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The Current Unmet
Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans, online: Legal Services Corporation
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... recent ... studies found a level of need substantially higher than the level found in
the [earlier] ABA study." 63 As a result, the report recommended substantially
increased levels of funding for the Legal Services Corporation, arguing that a
legal grievances through lawful means cannot
"[n]ation committed to disposition of 64
blindly turn away from this situation.
Similarly, the ABA unanimously approved a resolution in 2006 urging federal,
state and territorial governments to provide legal aid services in civil matters:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges federal,
state, and territorial governments to provide legal counsel as a matter
of right at public expense to low income persons in those categories
of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake,
such as those involving shelter, sustenance,65 safety, health or child
custody, as determined by each jurisdiction.
According to the ABA report, the matters identified in the resolution "involve
interests so fundamental and important as to require governments to supply low
income persons with effective access to justice as a matter of right"; in addition, the
report noted "a strong presumption [that] this mandates provision of lawyers in all
such cases. ' 66 Significantly, the report also noted that the test for determining need
for counsel should be "whether it can be honestly said that the litigant can obtain a
fair hearing without being represented by a lawyer," concluding that:
With rare exceptions, this will be true only when certain conditions
are met: the substantive law and procedures are simple; both parties
are unrepresented; both parties are individuals and neither is an
<www.lsc.gov/JusticeGap.pdf> [Justice Gap] (the Legal Services Corporation has national
responsibility for legal aid services in the USA).
63 Ibid at 13 [emphasis in original]; the exception was Vermont, but the report noted that this
study had adopted an abbreviated questionnaire and interview format; by contrast, the
Massachusetts report in 2003 documented an increased need in that state since an earlier study
in 1993.
64 Ibid at 19.
65 American Bar Association, "Report to the ABA House of Delegates" (ABA House of
Delegates, August 2006) Resolution 112A [ABA Report] (the report detailed efforts on the
part of the ABA, including its amicus briefs in cases such as Lassiter [above] to support the
extension of legal aid services in civil matters;. in examining a range of civil legal
proceedings, the report argued that there were many that threatened "loss of basic human
needs" which are equally adversarial and often more complex [than child welfare
proceedings]; the report argued that counsel is necessary to ensure equality before the law for
litigants and to ensure the "functioning of an effective justice system," and identified (at 7-8)
a number of efforts in some states to provide such counsel).
66 Ibid at 13 (the report included an expanded description of the services envisaged
in each
category).
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institutional party; both parties have the intellectual, English
language, and other skills required to participate effectively; and, the
proceedings are not adversarial, but rather the judge assumes
responsibility for and takes an active role in67 identifying the
applicable legal standards and developing the facts.

At the same time, however, since the ABA proposal focused only on the
provision of counsel in adversarial proceedings, it did not include recommendations
for advice and information about legal problems. 68 Indeed, in examining the history
and politics of legal aid in the United States, Earl Johnson Jr noted that no statute in
the United States has ever been enacted to provide for legal aid in civil matters, a
situation that is dramatically different from the United Kingdom or Western
Europe. 69 In addition, he identified a number of new and powerful political interests,
particularly the "civil justice reform" movement, as generating a hostile political
climate that decries both litigation and lawyers and that sees "appropriations for legal
using public money to do a bad thing - more bad lawyers to file more
services as just
' 70
lawsuits."
bad
Significantly, however, a 2009 report on civil legal aid suggested that "[t]he
United States may be entering a new era in civil legal aid" because there is a new
President and a new "administration sympathetic to rebuilding the civil legal aid
system and its long neglected infrastructure."' 7 1 While recognizing that civil legal aid
is not the highest priority of the new administration in Washington, the report argued
Ibid. at 14 (the report also argued for increased expenditure on legal aid services by
comparing national expenditures on medicaid ($200 billion per year and $4200 per eligible
person) to funding for civil legal aid at $60 to $100 per eligible poor person; the Report
argued (at 15) that legal aid expenditure represents a "minimal and justifiable investment" and
is just 1.5 percent of the annual cost of lawyers in American society overall).
67

Ibid at 13; See Julia Gordon, Equal Justice and the DigitalRevolution: Using Technology
to Meet the Legal Needs ofLow-Income People, online: National Legal Aid and Defender
68

Association <http://www.nlada.org> [Gordon, "Equal Justice"]; Julia Gordon, "Technology
Assisted Advocacy" (2000) 5:1 U.D.C. L. Rev. 235 [Gordon, "Technology Assisted"]
(provides recommendations about access to legal information and advice).
69 Earl Johnson, Jr., "Justice and Reform: A Quarter Century Later" in Francis Regan et al.,
The TransformationofLegal Aid: ComparativeandHistoricalStudies (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1999) 9 at 13-14.
70 Ibid at 36 [emphasis in original] (the ideological tenor of this claim is also shared by other
access to justice scholars; for example, John Kilwein firmly asserted that the drive to cut
government-funded legal aid is driven by ideology and self-interest in the United States); See
John Kilwein, "The Decline of the Legal Services Corporation: 'It's ideological, stupid!"' in
Francis Regan et al., The Transformationof Legal Aid: Comparativeand HistoricalStudies

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 41 at 58.
7' Alan Houseman, "Civil Legal Aid in the United States: An Update for 2009" (Paper
presented at the International Legal Aid Group Conference, Wellington, NZ, 1-3 April 2009)
(Houseman is Director of the Center for Law and Social Policy).

Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues

Vol. 29

that new appointments to the Legal Services Commission Board and the possibility
of new funding could substantially alter current arrangements for civil legal aid in the
United States.
As the recent LAO report, Technology in Aid of Client Services, suggested, the
use of technology has increased access to basic legal information in a number of
American jurisdictions. The leading technological tools include:
VII.
centralized, interactive websites, including public legal
education and self help;
VIII.
document assembly software;
IX.
video-based learning;
X.
online application and intake/online self-testing of
eligibility; and
72
video conferencing.
XI.
Although the report documented a number of these technologies in use in the
United States, it is important to note some of their limitations as well as their
advantages, particularly as identified in the work of the "Project for the Future of
Equal Justice", a joint project established by the Center for Law and Social Policy
and the National Legal Aid & Defender Association in the United States. 7 3 From
1997 to 2001, the Project engaged in concerted activities to help legal services
programs improve their use of technologies by "setting up a website ... [on legal]
issues, providing extensive training and education, modelling the use of innovative
technology, disseminating information about best practices, supporting increased
funding for technology," and establishing an advisory committee for future
74
initiatives.
Although the "Project" achieved a good deal with technological advances, its
future objectives and assessments of its activities reveal two significant issues for
consideration.
First, the use of technology is particularly challenging for the most vulnerable
individuals and communities. As the report explained, there are significant issues
at the intersection of technology policy and low-income
communities. These issues include universal access to the Internet,
Jeffrey Stutz & Lucille Narun, Technology in Aid of Client Services (Report for Legal Aid
Ontario, 2008) at 2 (the authors reported on responses of LAO participants at a seminar about
the expanded use of technology and noted that these participants "ranked creation of a
centralized, interactive website highest, equal in value to offering an online application
72

process for legal aid"; no information is available about who participated in the seminar, and
the extent to which these participants were involved in front-line delivery of legal aid at 3).
73 Gordon, "Equal Justice", supra note 68 at 2.
74 Ibid
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literacy (including information literacy), training in computer usage,
privacy issues, creation of relevant content, and use of technology by
.... 75
government and other service providers

Obviously, significant expenditures will be required to make technology effectively
and equally availableto the most vulnerable individuals and communities.

In addition, an assessment of the Project's goals reveals how the use of
technology to provide access to legal information and advice is much less useful,
unless it is also connected to an integrateddatabasefor lawyers and the courts - a

goal which would enable creation of a seamless justice system that provides
information, but also delivers "real" assistance to clients. 76 In the context of
developing technology for use at LAO, these larger goals need to be taken seriously
as well.
Overall, therefore, it is clear that the technology being utilized for information
and for service delivery in the United States is often relied upon because other legal
aid services are currently much less available in the United States than in most other
western jurisdictions, including Canada. 77 As the 2009 report noted, the use of
technology must be integrated with the provision of legal aid, efforts to assist selfrepresented litigants, the use of legal hotlines, pro bono arrangements, and expanded
' 79
efforts to "engage more private attorneys [and] provid[e] greater levels of service."
Significantly, this report commented on efforts to create in every state

"comprehensive, integrated [state-wide] delivery systems, ... often called statejustice
communities." As noted:
"5Ibid at 3.

Gordon, "Technology Assisted", supra note 68 at 240-24 1; See also John A. Tull, "The
Technologically Enabled Legal Services Delivery System from the Perspective of Senior
Management" (2000) 5:1 U.D.C. L. Rev. 247; Michael Genz, "Technology and Client
Community Access to Legal Services - Suggestive Scenarios on Community Legal Education,
Intake and Referral and Pro Se" (2000) 5:1 U.D.C. L. Rev. 225.
77 For example, Earl Johnson Jr. compared both per capita expenditures on civil legal aid
services and also relative shares of the GNP invested in publicly-funded civil legal aid
services in the 1990s; according to the figures presented, the United States was always the
lowest on these scales among a number of western jurisdictions. See Earl Johnson Jr., "Equal
Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United States and Other Industrial
Democracies" (2000-2001) 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. S83 at S93-S95.
78 Houseman, supranote 71 at 26; See also The ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and
76

Public Services, SupportingJustice: A Report on the Pro Bono Work ofAmerica 's Lawyers

(Chicago: American Bar Association, 2005) (the report surveyed 1100 lawyers in the United
States, in private practice, corporate counsel, government and academic settings, and reported
that two-thirds of respondents provided free pro bono services to people of limited means;
forty-six percent of the lawyers surveyed met the ABA's aspirational goal of providing fifty
hours of such services).
79 Supra note 71 at 20.
80 Ibid at 25 [emphasis added].
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[T]hese state justice communities seek to create a single point of
entry for all low-income clients, integrate all institutional and
individual providers and partners, allocate resources among
providers to ensure that representation can occur in all forums for all
low-income persons, and provide access to a range of services for all
eligible clients - no matter where they live, the language they speak,
member. 81
or the ethnic or cultural group of which they are a
Often organized by state Access to Justice Commissions created by the state
Supreme Courts, these justice communities have an ongoing existence and a charge
to "engage in ongoing assessment of the civil legal needs of low-income people in
the state and to develop, coordinate, and oversee initiatives to respond to those
needs." 82 Recently, the ABA Commission on Access to Civil Legal Aid was charged
with expanding Access to Justice Commissions in the states; its document, Principles
of a State System for the Delivery of Civil Legal Aid, was adopted by the House of
Delegates of the ABA in 2006.83
IDEAS FOR ONTARIO:

Although the history of legal aid in the United States may offer only a few
suggestions for Ontario, three aspects of this review of United States developments
are particularly significant.
1. Many of the reform proposalsof the American Bar Association and the Legal
Services Corporation, particularly with respect to civil legal aid, suggest ideas for
further research in any reassessment of legal aid priorities in Ontario; particularly as a
result of the change in administration in the United States in 2009, some proposed
initiatives may be implemented and provide useful models for experimentation here.
2. The American experience with technology in providing advice and assistance
may also provide useful models for some aspects of legal aid. At the same time, it is
clear that it will be necessary to take into account the limits of such arrangements for
the most disadvantaged and vulnerable members of the community, a point noted
above in the report of the Project for the Future of Equal Justice. Thus, links between
technology for advice and assistance on one hand, and legal representation on the
other, must be designed with specific communities in mind.
3. Finally, ideas about "state justice communities" and the role of "Access to
Justice Commissions" may offer a useful model for promoting better-integrated,
holistic services in responding to the needs of legal aid clients.
AUSTRALIA
Australia offers legal aid based on coordination between the federal government
and the states, a "mixed model ... established in the late 1970s as a result of a political
81 Ibid at 25.
82
83

Ibid
ABA Report, supra note 65 at 12B; See also ibid
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compromise brokered by governments and the private legal profession." 84 The
federal Attorney General's Department has overall responsibility for Commonwealth
policy and provides funding in accordance with Commonwealth-State agreements for
services delivered under the auspices of Legal Aid Commissions in each state and
territory; legal representation is often provided by private practitioners. Legal Aid
Commission staff provide duty lawyer, legal advice, telephone information, access to
primary dispute resolution facilities, and community legal education; while a network
of about two hundred community legal centres offer legal advice, social advocacy
and minor assistance. 85 Although family law is a matter of federal jurisdiction in
Australia, while criminal law has both federal and state aspects, "criminal
law
86
matters dominate legal aid cases in which legal [represen]tation is approved."
The federal government in Australia has identified "Priorities for
Commonwealth Legal Aid" and provided detailed "Guidelines" for implementing
87
them. In general terms, the Priorities reflect legal categories of family law, criminal
law, and civil law.8 8 Family law priorities include matters under three family law
statutes that relate to specified issues; while criminal law priorities relate to "the legal
representation of a person charged with a criminal offence", civil law priorities
include problems of employment compensation, Commonwealth pensions, benefits
or allowance, and matters such as discrimination, migration and consumer
protection.89 In addition to these three categories of Priorities, however, "other
matters" may be taken to be priorities in defined circumstances: that is, a matter not
included may become a priority if "special circumstances" exist. "Special
circumstances" include a language or literacy problem, an intellectual, psychiatric or
physical disability, residence in a remote location, a likelihood of domestic violence
in family law matters, or where the applicant is a child, etc. Clearly, the use of
"special circumstances" focuses on a client's individual circumstances, even though
Don Fleming & Anne Daly, "The retreat of the legal profession from legal aid: labour
market change in the Australian mixed model" (2007) 14:1 International Journal of the Legal
Profession 21 at 24 [Fleming & Daly]; See also Don Fleming & Francis Regan, "Re-visiting
the origins, rise and demise of the Australian Legal Aid Office" (2006) 13:1 International
Journal of the Legal Profession 69; Susan Armstrong, "Labor's legal aid scheme: The light
that failed" in R.B. Scotton and Helen Ferber, eds., Public Expenditures and Social Policy in
Australia, vol. II (Melbourne: Longman, Cheshire, 1979).
85 Fleming & Daly, ibid. at 24-25.
86 Ibid at 25 (the authors noted that in the decade 1990/91 to 2001/02, approvals in criminal
law rose by two-thirds, while the number of approvals for family law declined; however,
family law applications increased in 2001/02 to 1990/91 levels).
87 See Austl., Commonwealth, Legal Aid Western Australia, "Legal Aid Manual Chapter 7:
Commonwealth Legal Aid Priorities and Eligibility Guidelines ", online: Legal Aid Western
Australia <http://www.legalaid.wa.gov.au/page/InfoLawyers/pdf/chapter%20vii.pdf> at
Schedule 3 [Australia, Legal Aid Manual].
84

88 Ibid at 6.
89
90

Ibid. at ss. 1.5, 1,6.
Ibid at 7.
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the primary focus of the Commonwealth Legal Aid Priorities still relates to
categories of legalproceedings: family, criminal and civil law matters.
Three aspects of the Australian legal aid priorities are of interest in relation to
defining priorities for legal aid in Ontario.
One important feature of the Australian definition of legal aid priorities is the
nature of the tests applied to determine eligibility for legal aid services: these include
a "means test" that is applied by Legal Service Commissions, and also a "merits
test". The "merits test" includes three criteria: the reasonable prospects of success
test, 9 1 the "prudent self-funding litigant" test, 92 and the appropriateness of spending
limited public legal aid funds test. 93 Thus, even though the coverage for legal aid
services primarily reflects legal categories of family, criminal and civil law matters,
there is discretion in the application of these priorities, taking into account individual
needs or circumstances of applicants, and also the "public interest".
In addition, however, an applicant for specified services may be required to meet
additional category-specific tests. For example, in relation to summary criminal
prosecutions, legal aid may be provided if the applicant has a reasonable prospect of
acquittal; as well, legal aid may be provided if a conviction would have a
significantly detrimental effect on the applicant's livelihood or employment (current
or prospective), if it is unreasonable to expect the applicant to defend himself or
herself because of "special circumstances" as defined in the Priorities, if conviction
would be likely to result in a term of imprisonment (including a suspended term), or
if the applicant is a child.
In theory, at least, these factors work to ensure that legal aid is not provided
simply on the basis of legal categories, but rather look at the "need" for legal aid in a
more holistic fashion, particularly having regard to the circumstances of an individual
client, as well as overall policies for the provision of state resources. Although it
appears that, in practice, considerable priority is allocated to the issue of likelihood of
success, the Australian system nonetheless offers a useful model for reform that
moves4 away from legal categories to take account of different levels of individual
9
need.
9' See ibid at 10-11 (The test involves a consideration of the legal and factual merits, on the
basis of which the action is "more likely than not to succeed").
92 See ibid at 11 (The test is "met only if the Commission considers that a prudent selffunding litigant would risk his or her own financial resources in funding the proposed action";
according to the explanatory note, this test "aims to put assisted litigants into an equal but not
better position than private litigants without 'deep pockets' who risk their own funds").
9' See ibid. (The test requires the Commission to assess the costs involved in relation to the
"likely benefit to the applicant or, in appropriate circumstances, the community"; the
examples of inappropriate actions include applications to dispense with a spouse's consent to
a passport to enable a parent to travel overseas with a child; and some aspects of contact and
property disputes in family law where the issue is of minor significance, such as which parent
will pay for taxi or bus fares for a child).
94 Interview with representatives of the Legal Assistance Branch, Attorney General's
Department, Canberra Australia, 16 March 2009 [Interview]; See also Austl., Commonwealth,
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A second feature of the Australian priorities is that they encompass both
"litigation services" and "primary dispute resolution services", that is, measures of
alternative dispute resolution. 95 These arrangements are particularly important in the
provision of family legal aid services, where the Guidelines require consideration of
primary dispute resolution services before a grant of litigation services in all cases
except where primary dispute resolution services would be inappropriate. Such cases
include urgent needs for services, cases involving child abuse or allegations of such
abuse, cases in which there are issues of violence and coercion, clear evidence that
and cases in which there are
one party has refused to participate in such services,
96
services.
such
accessing
in
difficulties
practical
At the same time, some scholars have challenged assumptions within Australian
legal aid programs that alternative dispute resolution services are always less
expensive than legal services, and also that lawyers are always more prone to pursue
adversarial processes. In her assessment of family law disputes in Australia, for
example, Rosemary Hunter documented the costs of litigation and ADR services, and
effectively challenged the accuracy of assumptions that ADR is always less
expensive. She recommended more empirical research, particularly in the family law
context, where early access to legal advice and assistance seemed to foster earlier
dispute resolution processes
and more efficient resolution of matters; by contrast,
97

often prolonged such matters and increased their cost.
Clearly, such findings argue for concrete empirical data about costs and
outcomes in different legal contexts; as well as ongoing monitoring of these
arrangements. Indeed, there have been a number of studies in Australia, confirming
that family law clients (mainly women) who do not receive legal aid may be more
willing to accept disadvantageous settlements; and this problem is exacerbated for
98
women who have experienced domestic violence and who are not represented.
Thus, for LAO, it is important to understand that a choice to encourage primary
reliance on ADR processes in family law matters does not offer a panacea.

Attorney General's Department, Review of the Commonwealth Community Legal Services
Program:Achieving a Just and Secure Society March 2008, online: Australian Government

<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE0978
01 FF)-AOOCommunity+Legal+Services+Program+-+Review++Final+Report.pdf/$file/AOOCommunity+Legal+Services+Program+-+Review++Final+Report.pdf>.
95 Commonwealth Priorities, section 1.2. Australia, Legal Aid Manual, supranote 87 at 6.
96 Ibid at 13-14.
9'Rosemary Hunter, "Adversarial Mythologies: Policy Assumptions and Research Evidence
in Family Law" (2003) 30:1 J.L. & Soc'y 156 [Hunter, "Adversarial Mythologies"].
98 Austrl., Commonwealth, Law Reform Commission, Equality before the Law: Justicefor
Women, (Report No. 69), (1994), online: Australian Law Reform Commission
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/69/voll/ALRC69Ch4.html> at
4.1; Batts J, "Challenging the Legal System's Response to Domestic Violence" (Paper
delivered in Brisbane, Australia, 23-26 March 1994).
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The Australian government recently adopted a "Social Inclusion Agenda" which
includes principles to enable all Australians to be able to play a full role in all aspects
of Australian life. The principles include reducing disadvantage, increasing social,
civil and economic participation, a greater voice and greater responsibility, building
on individual and community strengths, building partnerships with stakeholders,
developing tailored services, giving a high priority to early intervention and
prevention, building joined up services, using evidence and integrated data to inform
policy, using locational approaches, and planning for sustainability. 99 This policy
services in Australia, and
agenda has implications for the provision of governmental
00
'
aid.
legal
of
provision
the
for
policies
affect
may
In this context, there is also important Australian research about the strengths
and challenges of integrated legal service delivery. For example, the state
government in Victoria adopted a framework to address the "causes and
consequences of disadvantage", which specifically addresses the need to improve
access to justice, help disadvantaged groups access services, and localize service
solutions.' 0 1 Although there has been some success in integrating the delivery of
legal, health and welfare services, Mary Anne Noone has also identified some of the
challenges of integration: a number of different funders with differing priorities;
responsibilities; and the
different professionals with differing roles and professional
10 2
need for protocols for resolving organizational issues.
NEW ZEALAND

Pursuant to the Legal Services Act 2000, most legal services in New Zealand
were provided by private practitioners, who acted for paying clients as well as for
those eligible for legal aid. 103 However, there have been several changes. In 2004, for

Austi., Commonwealth, SocialInclusion Principlesfor Australia,online: Australian
Government <http://www.socialinclusion.gov.au/SlAgenda/Principles/Pages/default.aspx>.
99 See
100
101

Interview, supra note 94.
Austl., Victoria, Department of Planning and Community Development, A FairerVictoria

2005: CreatingOpportunityand Addressing Disadvantage,online: Government of Victoria

<http://www.dpcd.vic.gov.au/webl 4/dvc/rwpgslib.nsf/GraphicFiles/A+Fairer+Victoria+2005/
$file/AFV+05.pdf>.
102 Mary Anne Noone, "Towards Integrated Legal Service Delivery" (Paper presented
to the
International Legal Aid Group Conference, Wellington, New Zealand, 1-3 April 2009),
online: Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1425099>. (Noone's
paper also reviews literature concerning other programs of integrated service delivery in the
UK and the US).
103 Law Commission of New Zealand / Te Aka Matua 0 Te Ture, DeliveringJustice
for All. A
Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals (Wellington: Law Commission, March 2004) at

27 [DeliveringJusticefor All] (the Commission noted that these statistics were obtained from
the Legal Service Agency Performance Report in January 2003 (however, according to a Law
Commission report in 2004, legal aid in criminal cases was not generally available unless
imprisonment was a possible sentence; the report also indicated that the number of refusals of
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example, the Public Defence Service was introduced as a pilot project, and following
an evaluation in 2008, the Minister of Justice authorized its continuation on a
permanent basis. 104 In addition, the Legal Services Amendment Act of 2007
implemented changes to eligibility and debt establishment and repayment. Finally, in
2008, the Legal Services Agency introduced a streamlined approach to the
administration of legal aid in family cases: the change means upfront approval of
maximum grants at a Slevel
- 105sufficient to cover eighty percent of family legal aid cases
It appears, however, that client representation by
through to conclusion.
Community Law Centres is negligible, because of the need for the Centres to show
"unmet need" for representation in their communities and to obtain an exemption
from the local law society to offer representation services. 106 A Law Commission
report in 2004 also described the initial assistance, advice and representation services
offered in criminal proceedings by the Duty Solicitor scheme, services available to all
defendants regardless of means, but often curtailed in practice as a result of time
pressures on the part of participating solicitors. 107
The 2004 Law Commission report made a number of recommendations to
improve legal aid services. First, the Commission noted the requirements of the New
Zealand Bill of Rights: that a person charged with an offence has a right to consult
and instruct a lawyer, and to receive legal assistance without cost if the interests of
justice so require (and the person does not have sufficient means to obtain that
and that a defendant has a right to a fair and public hearing by an
assistance);
independent and impartial court. 109 In this context, the Commission concluded that
legal aid services in criminal cases was about 5000 per annum since 1998, and that the
numbers in family law cases had doubled to about 1000 per year since 1998).
104 See Legal Services Agency, "National Report: New Zealand" (Paper prepared for the
International Legal Aid Group Conference, Wellington, New Zealand, 1-3 April 2009) at 1718, online: International Legal Aid Group Conference
<http://www.ilagnet.org/reports/NewZealand.pdf> [National Report: NZ]; See also Sonia
Ogier & Richard Tait, Evaluation of the Public Defence Pilot. FinalReport (May 1 2008)

(report prepared for Legal Services Agency and peer-reviewed by Martin Jenkins), online: the
Legal Services Agency
<http://www.Isa.govt.nz/documents/PublicDefenceServicepilotevaluationFinalReport.pdf>
(the PDS employs a staff of 28, of whom 22 are lawyers, at 9).
105 National Report: New Zealand, ibid at 18-19.
DeliveringJusticefor All, supra note 103 at 27-28.
Ibid at 28.
'08 New ZealandBill ofRights Act 1990 (N.Z.), 1990/109, ss. 24(c), (d) and (f); See Grant
106

107

Huscroft, "Protecting Rights and Parliamentary Sovereignty: New Zealand's Experience with
a Charter-Inspired,Statutory Bill of Rights" (2002) 21 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 111
(provides an overview of the New ZealandBill of Rights in relation to Canada's Charterof
Rights and Freedoms).
109 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ibid at s. 25(a); See also supra note 103 ("the

principles of natural justice may also mean that litigants [in civil cases] require
representation" at 25).
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there was evidence in New Zealand of a "need for initiatives to increase access to
representation in courts, to expand legal advice for those who are unrepresented0
through necessity and to improve assistance to those who wish to self-represent.""
Among others, the Commission's recommendations included creation of an
obligation on the part of police to inform people in custody of the Police Detention
Legal Assistance Scheme and minimum standards of representation and advice for
people charged with a criminal offence;"' l the Commission also recommended
reforms to the Duty Solicitor scheme, 112 opportunities for representation on the part
of Community Law Centres, 1 13 and the creation of law clinics by university law
schools.' 14
From Ontario's perspective, of course, many of these initiatives are already in
place. However, the Commission's report made two additional recommendations
which bear further examination in Ontario.
The Commission's extended analysis of current arrangements for providing
legal information and advice resulted in recommendations for substantial reforms. In
particular, the Commission recommended that "a state agency should have lead
responsibility for developing an integrated and coordinated legal information
strategy" to assist the whole community in relation to the court system. 115
In this context, the Commission also argued that the enactment of new
legislation creating public rights and duties should always be accompanied by
information to assist the public to understand their rights and duties. 116 Although
recommendations in a number of jurisdictions have tended to encourage more legal
advice and information services in recent years, the NZ Law Commission's analysis
is particularly detailed; moreover, the idea of connecting such services to
governmental responsibilities to provide information about newly-enacted rights is
110 DeliveringJusticeforAll, supra note 103 at 26 (the report identified the vulnerability of an

unrepresented person, as well as the problems created for the administration of courts, as a
result of a lack of representation).
The scheme was established pursuant to the Legal Services Act 2000 (N.Z.), 2000/42, ss.

".

50-51, but police took the position that they had no general duty to inform a person in custody
of the existence of the scheme; the Commission agreed with the New Zealand Court of
Appeal's decision in R. v. KaiJi in 2003 that giving advice about the scheme was "integral to
a fair opportunity for the person to decide whether or not to exercise the right: see R. v. Ji,
(2003), [2004] 1 N.Z.L.R. 59 (C.A.); ibid at 29; the New ZealandBill of Rights also provides
for a right of access to legal advice: see s. 23(l)(b); DeliveringJusticefor All, supra note 103
at 29.
"' Ibid at 30-31 (the Commission also commended a pilot project on the part of the Legal
Services Agency for salaried services in criminal matters).
'13 Ibid at 31.
"14 Ibid at 35.
5Ibid at 13-15 (the recommendations detailed the specific obligations of the state agency
with lead responsibility, and suggested a variety of delivery methods to ensure widespread
access to this information).
116 Ibid at 13.
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interesting. These recommendations reflect some of the concerns in the Trebilcock
Report about the need for more, more accessible, and better-coordinated legal
information. 117
A second recommendation concerned the need to create a new Community
Court, with jurisdiction to deal with high volume, less serious criminal and civil
cases, and using its own principles, style and processes, developed in consultation
118
with community representatives.
The Commission recommended that Community
Courts be designed to be accessible and responsive to their communities, particularly
indigenous communities, and be a "portal for general information and advice for all
court jurisdictions." 19
Although these New Zealand recommendations may not focus expressly on
legal aid, they illustrate how any process of defining priorities must be assessed
within a broader context, one that includes accessible information about law and legal
processes, and which may need to involve new arrangements for courts and other
legal processes to meet access to justice goals. In this way, the New Zealand Law
Commission proposals reveal how an understanding of legal aid priorities necessarily
occurs in the context of other initiatives and legal processes concerning access to
justice. 120
UNITED KINGDOM (ENGLAND AND WALES)

Legal aid arrangements in the United Kingdom have been historically influential
in Ontario, where the Legal Aid Act of 1966 was expressly modelled on legislation
enacted in the United Kingdom in 1949 pursuant to the recommendations of the
Rushcliffe Committee. 12 1 As in the United Kingdom, Ontario's legal aid program
was initially based on a judicare system, which reimbursed lawyers for services
provided, and it generally offered legal aid to impecunious persons in matters for
which lawyers regularly provided advice and assistance to paying clients.
By the 1980s, however, the British government was increasingly concerned
about legal aid costs, and after several initiatives to reform the system, the
government enacted the Access to Justice Act in 1999, exactly fifty years after the
7
1"
Supranote 7 at 102, 103-109.

118DeliveringJusticefor All,

supra note 103 at 119 (the recommendation also included

abolition of the existing District Courts).
119Ibid.

See e.g. N.Z., Law Commission, SubsidisingLitigation (Report 72) (Wellington: Law
Commission, May 2001); See also N.Z., Ministry of Social Development, Statement of Intent
2005/06 (Wellington, 2005); Don Gray, Focusing on Outcomes: Monitoring Results:
Developments in New Zealand (Paper presented at the International Legal Aid Group
Conference, Wellington, New Zealand, 1-3 April 2009), online: International Legal Aid
Group Conference <www.ccsd.ca/cswp/2005/managingforoutcomes>.
121 See Tamara Goriely, "The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales"
in
Richard Young & David Wall, eds., Access to CriminalJustice (London: Blackstone Press,
1996) 26 [Young & Wall, Access to CriminalJustice] (for a history of legal aid services,
particularly focusing on services in criminal law).
120
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"Rusheliffe" statute. Pursuant to the 1999 Act, there are two main schemes for legal
aid services: the Criminal Defence Service and the Community Legal Service. As
critics such as Michael Zander argued, the 1999 statute was a milestone in legal aid
services, but a very different kind of milestone from the 1949 Act: "[While] [t]he
1949 Act was an opening of the door to justice for citizens[,] [t]he ...
1999 Act has in
effect erected a large notice over that door entitled 'Restricted Entry'."122 According
to Zander, the government's reforms did not spring from a desire to improve access
to justice, but from the Treasury's need to control the budget. 123 As Zander's
comments suggest, these recent legal
aid reforms in England and Wales have
124
generated considerable controversy.
In addition, these reforms have fostered a good deal of research by academics
and policy makers. 12 5 As a number of the research studies suggest, however, it is
impossible to examine legal aid reforms without also taking into account the political
impact of "social exclusion" initiatives introduced by the Labour Party a few months
after its election in 1997.126 More specifically, the new Labour government
established a Social Exclusion Unit, which defined social exclusion, not just in terms
Michael Zander, The State ofJustice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) at 7.
Ibid at 24.
124 See also Carolyn Regan, "National Report: England and Wales" (Paper presented to the
International Legal Aid Group Conference, Wellington, New Zealand, 1-3 April 2009),
online: International Legal Aid Group Conference <http://www.ilagnet.org/reports.htm>
(according to the figures presented in the paper, the cost of legal aid in 2007-08 was
L2,058.6m, with 56% spent on criminal law and 38% on civil matters; and 6% on
administration; by contrast, 40% of "legal aid acts of assistance" were provided in civil
matters, and 60% in criminal law at 4).
122
123

125

See e.g. Hazel Genn, Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think about Going to Law

(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999) [Germ, "Paths to Justice"]; Hazel Genn & Alan Paterson,
Paths to Justice Scotland: what people in Scotland do and think about going to law (Oxford:

Hart Publishing, 2001) [Genn, "Paths to Justice Scotland"]; Pascoe Pleasence, Causes of
Action: Civil Law and Social Justice, 2d ed. (London: Legal Services Commission, 2006)

[Pleasence, "Causes of Action"]; Zander, The State of Justice,supra note 120 at 29-33
(Zander offered a trenchant analysis of the findings in Genn, Paths to Justice, concluding that
"[w]hether one thinks that a person should involve him or herself in legal proceedings can
only be answered sensibly in the context of a particular situation with knowledge of the full
facts ...
Trying for research purposes to evaluate someone else's decision to do nothing in
pursuing a legal remedy is ...
an exercise fraught with difficulties" at 32-33).
126 The Labour Party, under Tony Blair, was elected in May 1997 and publicized its planned
Social Exclusion Unit a few months later in August 1997. The Unit was initially set up for
two years and was based in the Cabinet Office, reporting directly to the Prime Minister, Tony
Blair. Its mandate was to produce "joined-up solutions to joined-up problems." In 2002, the
Unit was moved from the Cabinet Office to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and
more recent reports have engaged in further efforts of"mainstreaming exclusion." See Ruth
Levitas, The Inclusive Society? Social Exclusion and New Labour, 2d ed. (Houndmills,

Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005) at 1, 193, 219 [Levitas, The Inclusive
Society?].

Vol. 29

Comparing and Understanding Legal Aid Priorities

of low incomes, but as also including "all those linked and reinforcing problems that
can act to prevent effective social engagement."' 12 7 According to Ruth Levitas, the
originated in French social policy and then spread throughout
idea of social exclusion
128
the European Union.
However, even as the concept of "exclusion" became an increasingly prevalent
term for government policy makers, Levitas noted that "there were competing
discourses of exclusion within individual countries, as well as within Europe."'
According to Levitas, there were three possible discourses in Britain:
[A] "redistributionist" discourse situated in critical social policy, in
which social exclusion is intertwined with poverty; a "moral
underclass" discourse which uses cultural rather than material
explanations of poverty; and a "social integrationist" discourse
which sees inclusion primarily in terms of labour market attachment
(getting a job). As Levitas argued, these meanings of "social
exclusion" have been deployed in different ways in political' projects,
'3
so that "social exclusion is an essentially contested concept. 1 0
Although the concept of "social exclusion" continues to be contested, it has
significantly influenced legal aid policies in the past decade, particularly for civil
matters in England and Wales. Thus, as Buck, Balmer and Pleasence argued, a
primary responsibility of the 1999 Act's Community Legal Service is "helping people
Alexy Buck, Nigel Balmer & Pascoe Pleasence, "Social Exclusion and Civil Law:
Experience of Civil Justice Problems among Vulnerable Groups" (2005) 39:3 Social Policy &
Administration 302 at 303 [Buck, Balmer & Pleasence] (the authors identify the definition of
"social exclusion" by the Social Exclusion Unit as "a shorthand term for what can happen
when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment,
poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime, bad health and family breakdown" at
303).
128 Levitas, supra note 126 at 2 (the Nice Summit in 2000 specified four
key objectives,
including facilitating participation in employment and access by all to resources, rights, goods
and services; preventing the risks of exclusion; helping the most vulnerable; and mobilizing
all relevant bodies in overcoming exclusion; as Levitas points out "most member states
[including Britain] for the 2001 plan ... simply reorganized its existing policy and statistics
under the Nice headings" at 190-91).
127

129

Ibid.; See also Amartya Sen, Social Exclusion: Concept,Application, and Scrutiny

(Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2000) online: Asian Development Bank,
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/SocialExclExclu/Social-exclusion.pdf> [Sen,
"Social Exclusion"].
130 Ibid. at 2-3; for some commentary on Levitas, see Stephen Driver, Book Review of
The
Inclusive Society? Social Exclusion and New Labour by Ruth Levitas, (2006) 40:3 Social

Policy and Administration 330; Stephen Driver, Book Review of Not so New Labour:A
SociologicalCritique of New Labour's Policy and Practiceby Simon Prideaux, (2006) 40:3

Social Policy and Administration 330; and Finn Bowring, "Social exclusion: limitations of the
debate" (2000) 20:3 Critical Social Policy 307.
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out of social exclusion and preventing them from experiencing social exclusion in the
first place.", 13 1 In this context, research has attempted to define relationships between
"social exclusion" and the prevalence of "justiciable problems", that is, problems for
which there is a potential legal remedy, whether or not an individual identifies the
problem as "legal". For example, research conducted by the Legal Services
Commission (in 2001, 2004 and 2007) explored people's responses to justiciable
problems and the success of procedures adopted to resolving them. 132 In general
terms, the research suggests that low income is not the only factor affecting "social
parenthood may
exclusion"; factors such as age, disability, homelessness, and single
13 3
also contribute significantly to experiences of social exclusion.
Concepts of "social exclusion" have also contributed to new legal aid
arrangements; 13 4 specifically, the idea of entitlement to civil legal aid is being
replaced by "a scheme of prioritising cases and resources (rationing) as a way of
meeting the needs of the general public within a limited budget."' 3 5 In this context,
there are two significant strategies:
One strategy involves emphasis on the provision of more and better information
and advice about law, a strategy designed to prevent problems, to enable individuals
to take responsibility for resolving problems more efficiently, and to reduce the need
for access to courts. For example, a 2005 report suggested that
[t]he promotion of earlier and more effective resolution of disputes is
part of the Government's vision of empowering people and
communities to achieve a fair and decent society with opportunity
and security for all in a changing world ... Unresolved disputes and
legal challenges can act as barriers that stop people fulfilling their

Buck, Balmer & Pleasence, supra note 127 at 304.
Ibid. at 305-306 (this research was conducted by the Legal Services Research Centre, the
independent research arm of the Legal Services Commission; it includes a national periodic
survey ofjusticiable problems; the first survey was conducted in 2001 and a follow up study
occurred in 2004, and involves more than 5000 households; the most recent study was
undertaken in 2007).
133 Ibid. at 317-320; Alexy Buck et al., "Lone Parents and Civil Law: Their Experiences of
Problems and their Advice-Seeking Behaviour" (2004) 38:3 Social Policy and Administration
253 [Buck, "Lone Parents"]; Pascoe Pleasence et al., "Multiple Justiciable Problems:
Common Clusters and Their Social and Demographic Indicators" (2004) 1:2 Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies 310 [Pleasence et al., "Multiple Justiciable Problems"].
134 Richard Moorhead anticipated many of the issues in his 1998 article, "Legal Aid in the Eye
of a Storm: Rationing, Contracting, and a New Institutionalism" (1998) 25:3 J.L. & Soc'y
365.
135 Richard Moorhead, "Third Way Regulation? Community Legal Service Partnerships"
(2001) 64 Mod. L. Rev. 543 at 550 [Moorhead, 'Third Way"].
131

132
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opportunities that should be available to
talent and can limit the
36
every part of society. 1

In implementing this goal, the structure of legal aid services was revised to
include better advice and information about legal problems, including partnerships
as a result,
with community organizations such as Citizen Advice Bureaux;
rights and
legal
individuals are expected to take responsibility for understanding
obligations and to inform themselves about options for resolving problems, just as
they must embrace other measures (including finding paid work) to overcome
problems of "social exclusion". 138 As Hilary Sommerlad argued, the result of this
primary emphasis on the provision of information is that "'access to services'
becomes an alternative 39to just outcomes, even if [the] service is simply a 'hit' on a
legal advice website." 1
The second strategy focuses on new arrangements for legal assistance. The
Commission introduced a system of preferred suppliers (solicitors' firms) through
mark, with
franchising, and new efforts to achieve quality control through
•
•a quality
140
As Richard
exclusive contracts for providing identified services to clients.
Moorhead argues, such "contractualism (the heightened use of contract in
determining relationships between governmental organisations and providers of
public services) grew alongside 'new public management' (NPM) techniques which

U.K., Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs "A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid" (Paper
presented to the Parliament, July 2005), online: Department for Constitutional Affairs
<http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm65/6591/6591 .pdf>.
137 U.K., Department for Constitutional Affairs and the Law Centres Federation, Legal and
136

Advice Services: A Pathway to Regeneration (February 2004), online: The Ministry of Justice

<http://www.dca.gov.uk/pubs/reports/pathway.pdf> [Department for Constitutional Affairs];
See also Lord Chancellor's Department and Law Centres Federation, Legal andAdvice
Centres: A Pathway out of SocialExclusion (November 2001), online: The Ministry of Justice

<http://www.dca.gov.uk/laid/socex/index.htm>; National Association of Citizens Advice
Bureaux, Geography ofAdvice: An Overview of the Challenges Facingthe Community Legal

Service (2004), online: Citizens Advice,
<http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/geographyofadvice>.
138 Such arrangements are consistent with ideas of"responsabilization" in criminology.
See
in
of
Crime
Control
State:
Strategies
the
Sovereign
"The
Limits
of
e.g. David Garland,
Contemporary Society" (1996) 36 Brit. J. Crim. 445.
139 Hilary Sommerlad, "Reflections on the reconfiguration of access to justice" (2008)
15:3
International Journal of the Legal Profession 179 at 190 [Sommerlad, "Reflections"]
(Sommerlad's comments were based on legal aid arrangements in the UK prior to the Carter
reforms); See Lord Carter of Coles, Legal Aid: A Market-basedApproach to Reform (2006),

online: Lord Carter's Review <http://www.legalaidprocurementreview.gov.uk/docs/carterreview-p3.pdf>.
140 Moorhead, "Third Way", supranote 135 at 550-551.
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draw on quality assurance, management and auditing approaches...". 141 Not
surprisingly, critics have expressed concerns about the ways in which these new
arrangements challenge traditional ideas about legal professionalism: the danger is
142
that the audit rather than the legal aid client assumes central importance.
These developments in the United Kingdom may have some significance for the
process of understanding and comparing legal aid priorities in Ontario. First, it is
clear that ideas of "social exclusion" may also resonate in Ontario, even though the
content of this phrase may be just as undefined as in Britain and elsewhere in Europe;
the concept seems to have created renewed interest in defining needs for services, and
concerning clusters or cascades of
there is already some Canadian research 143
context.
law
civil
the
in
problems"
"justiciable
More significantly, the emphasis on "social exclusion" in British political
discourse, along with concerns about the cost of legal services, have resulted in
priorities for strengthening community advice services, thus reinforcing ideas of
individual responsibility for seeking help and solving problems. Finally, to some
extent at least, the use of contracts and franchising for the provision of legal aid by
solicitors may also suggest that legal representation is to be undertaken on a more
routinized basis, and only after other efforts to solve problems outside the courts have
been exhausted. Along with management tools for ensuring quality and
accountability, such arrangements not only define priorities for legal aid, but may
also redefine traditional relationships between lawyers and legal aid clients.
SIGNIFICANTLY, THE OVERALL CONTEXT IN ENGLAND AND WALES SEEMS TO
PRESENT A PARADOX

On one hand, the emphasis on providing legal information and substantial
efforts to create "routinized" legal services are based on a "model citizen" who is
responsible, articulate, and thus able to "solve her own problems" with just a bit of
advice. Yet at the same time, research conducted by the LSRC's legal needs and
justiciable problems studies confirms that the most vulnerable clients suffer multiple
and cascading problems that require more than a bit of advice. As Sommerlad
concluded:

Ibid. at 545 (as Moorhead argues, these management and auditing approaches are heavily
imbued with paradigms based on accounting and economic efficiency).
142 Ibid at 560-562; Hilary Sommerlad, "Managerialism and the Legal Profession: A New
Professional Paradigm" (1995) 2 International Journal of the Legal Profession 159; Hilary
Sommerlad & David Wall, Legally Aided Clients and their Solicitors: Qualitative
141

Perspectiveson Quality and Legal Aid (London: Law Society, 1999).
143 Ab Currie, "The nature and extent of unmet need for criminal legal aid in Canada" (2004)
11:3 International Journal of the Legal Profession 191; Ab Currie, "A national survey of the
civil justice problems of low and moderate income Canadians: incidence and patterns" (2005)
13:3 International Journal of the Legal Profession 217 [Currie, "A National Survey"].
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[The] social model of the law is undermined by the discourse of
a condition
marketisation, contractualisation and individualisation ...
of the poor's poverty is their effective exclusion from democratic
and legal and governmental process, other than as objects, and hence
from the imagined community of civil society... . [T]he discourse of
inclusion is disingenuous when it is part and parcel of projects to
residualise welfare and its recipients. 1
EUROPE: A NOTE ON SELECTED JURISDICTIONS

Legal aid and related initiatives have also been established in the civil law
jurisdictions of Western Europe. Indeed, an American lawyer described the Dutch
legal aid scheme in 1989 as "one of the best in the world: probably the best."' 145 As
Tamara Goriely explained, the Dutch system "succeeds in offering legal assistance
about a wide range of problems to a large number of people at a reasonable price,"
although it too experienced pressures in the 1990s in relation to rising costs. 146
Interestingly, Goriely concluded that the existence of a system of Buros Voor
Rechtshulp, in which lawyers paid at civil service rates provided advice and
assistance, made legal services accessible and open; and since these law services
they also helped to hold down the
competed with lawyers in private practice,
147
remuneration paid to private lawyers.
However, the Dutch system for legal aid was revised substantially in 1994,
pursuant to the Legal Aid Act. There are two arrangements for the provision of legal
aid: the Legal Services Counters, which provide front line services; and the
availability of private lawyers or mediators if these services are required. If a matter
requires more than three hours of service, it is necessary to make an application to the
Legal Aid Board,
and eligibility for legal aid depends on income and assets available
48
1
client.
to the

144Sommerlad, "Reflections", supra note 139 at 189-90; Pascoe Pleasence, Nigel J. Balmer &
Alexy Buck, eds., Transforming Lives: Law and Social Process,papersfrom the Legal
Services Research Centres InternationalResearch Conference (London: Legal Services

Commission, 2006); Genn, "Paths to Justice", supra note 122.
145
Clinton Bamberger, "Statement to the Committee on Legal Aid in the Netherlands,"
reported in 1989 10 Rechtshulp 2, University of Leiden, cited in Tamara Goriely, "Legal Aid
in the Netherlands: A View from England" (1992) 55:6 Modem Law Review 803 at 821.
146 Goriely, ibid at 811.
141
Ibid. at 817; See also Erhard Blankenburg, "The Lawyers' Lobby and the Welfare State:
The Political Economy of Legal Aid" in Francis Regan et al., eds., The Transformationof
Legal Aid: Comparativeand HistoricalStudies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 113.
148 Susanne Peters, Lia Combrink & Peter van den Biggelaar, "National Report: The
Netherlands" (Paper presented to the International Legal Aid Group Conference, Wellington
NZ, 1-3 April 2009) at 2-4; See also Peter van den Biggelaar, "The Legal Services Counter:
Lessons Learned" (on file with author).
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In addition, about one-quarter of Dutch households had legal expense insurance
by 2006.149 Belgium also introduced legal expense insurance in 2007, and it seems
that legal services in Germany rely on legal expense insurance (LEI) more than on
legal aid.15 0As Matthias Kilian and Francis Regan argued, however, legal aid and
legal expense insurance are "two sides of the same coin, different responses to the
same problem of the failure of the market for delivering legal services to all." 15 1 In an
examination of LEI in Germany and Sweden, however, the authors concluded that
although legal aid and LEI might operate well together to provide greater access to
law, LEI by itself could not replicate legal aid for the poorest clients, both because of
scope and also because poor clients may not be able to purchase such
its limited
•152
insurance. Although the Trebilcock Report similarly recommended consideration
of legal insurance as a means of furthering access to justice, the Report did not
specifically focus on this relatively limited impact for poor persons.153
In the context of this brief overview of developments in other jurisdictions, it
seems that the problems are similar for both common law and civil law jurisdictions.
as the Trebilcock Report similarly concluded, "there is no
Unfortunately,
54
panacea."1
SUMMARY: IDEAS FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION IN ONTARIO

This summary of recent developments in other jurisdictions suggests a number
of possible strategies to be considered in developing legal aid priorities in Ontario:
As in the United States, it is important to examine the usefulness of technology
in the provision of legal information and advice, while nonetheless recognizing the
challenges of using it with respect to the most vulnerable individuals and
communities; and the need to develop technologies that can be connected to larger
and more integrated databases that include lawyers and the courts. In addition, it will
be important to maintain a "watching brief' with respect to developments in civil
149 Peters et al., ibid. at 3 (the percentage of households with legal expense insurance in 2006

was 28%, up from 14% in 2000).

150 Steven Gibens, "National Report: Belgium" (Paper presented to the International Legal
Aid Group Conference, Wellington NZ, 1-3 April 2009) at 1.
151 Matthias Kilian & Francis Regan, "Legal expenses insurance and legal aid - two sides of
the same coin? The experience from Germany and Sweden" (2004) 11:3 International Journal
of the Legal Profession 233 (as the authors note there is an EU directive which regulates LEI,
but it sets up only a general framework; thus, LEI follows "business principles" while legal
aid is generally defined in public policy at 234).
152 Ibid at 252; See also Konstanze Plett, "Competing Objectives in Civil Justice: The
German Experience" in Allan C. Hutchinson, ed., Access to Civil Justice (Toronto: Carswell,
1990) 155 at 175 (Plett argues goals of efficiency and access to civil courts are in conflict:
there is a gap between the ideal and reality).
153 Supranote 7 at 96-97.
154 Ibid at 113; See also Lua Kamdl Yuille, "No One's Perfect (Not Even Close):
Reevaluating Access to Justice in the United States and Western Europe" (2003-2004) 42
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 863.
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legal aid in the United States; and to follow carefully the expansion of Access to
Justice Commissions in the states, as they implement measures to integrate the
delivery of services, including legal aid.
As in Australia, it is useful to explore more fully the possibility of using
concepts of "special circumstances", in defining legal aid priorities; particularly in
the context of the Australian government's Social Inclusion agenda, such factors may
offer important opportunities for (re)conceptualizing the basis for the provision of
legal aid to individuals and communities, and the use of different kinds of legal
services.
As in New Zealand, the idea of LAO as a "lead agency" with responsibility for
coordinating access to legal information for the public offers a significant opportunity
to (re)imagine LAO's responsibilities in terms of both the provision of services and
the coordination and integration of social and legal services. In this context, it may
also be important to follow the use of community courts as a means of providing
more access to justice.
As in the United Kingdom (England and Wales), there is a need for serious and
critical reflection about the concept of "social exclusion" and its (paradoxical)
relationship to research about "legal needs" and "justiciable problems". In this
context, it is critical to examine how useful is an emphasis on providing legal
information alone, particularly for the most vulnerable individuals and communities;
it is also important to take note of the impact of new arrangements for the provision
of lawyers' services to legal aid clients, assessing both the advantages and
disadvantages.
As in Europe, it may be important to consider the expansion of arrangements for
legal expense insurance, as noted in the Trebilcock Report. At the same time, it is
important to understand LEI and legal aid as related and complementary
arrangements; LEI will never replace legal aid for the most disadvantaged individuals
and communities.
Several of these options will be considered in more detail in Part IV.
3. THE CHARTER AND LAO RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING LEGAL AID
The right to publicly-funded legal representation is an evolving area
of law. In spite of the failure of the framers of the Charterto include
the right [to legal aid] in the Charter, the courts are recognizing that,
in a free and democratic country, publicly-funded legal
representation may be necessary in both criminal and civil law cases
to ensure that the principles of fundamental justice are respected. The
55
judgment is made on a case-by-case basis.1
155 Vicki

Schmolka, "Introduction" in Making the Case: The Right to Publicly-FundedLegal
Representation in Canada(Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 2002) 1E at 22E [CBA
Report] [emphasis added]. There are numerous provisions of the Charterrelevant to legal aid;
See e.g. Mary Jane Mossman, "Toward a Comprehensive Legal Aid Program in Canada:
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As this conclusion from the CBA study in 2002 explained, there is no general
constitutional right to legal aid in criminal or civil law cases in Canada. 156 Although
a number of judicial decisions have defined rights to publicly-funded legal aid in
specific circumstances, no court has held that there is a general, entrenched
constitutional right to legal aid. As the CBA study suggested, however, "common
law, case law, statutes, the constitution, the Charter, and the rule of law that is the
underpinning to our democracy all offer the grounds for individuals to claim a right
to legal aid in certain circumstances"; in this context, it is also necessary to take
account of obligations in international conventions with respect to access to legal
157
processes.
In Canada, however, courts have recently denied broad and general claims for
publicly-funded legal aid services in British Columbia (A.G.) v. Christie158 and in
CanadianBar Association v. British Columbia.159 In this context, entitlement to legal
aid continues to reflect a piecemeal approach in specific circumstances, 160 rather than
a general entrenched constitutional right. 161 In practice, moreover, the circumstances
Exploring the Issues" (1993) 4 Windsor Rev. Legal and Soc. Issues 1 [Mossman,
"Comprehensive
Legal Aid"].
15 6
CBA Report, ibid at 2E-4E.

157

Ibid at 2E; See also Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 684(1), 694(1); Youth

CriminalJusticeAct, S.C. 2002, c. 1, ss. 25(4)(a), 25(6)(a)(i); The Child andFamily Services

Act, S.S. 1989-90, c. C-7.2, s.70 (there are specific provisions set out in each of these Acts,
mandating legal aid in prescribed situations).

158 2007 SCC 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873 at 874, 280 D.L.R. (4th) 528 [Christie].
159 2006 BCSC 1342, [2007] 1 W.W.R. 331, [2006] B.C.J. No. 2015; See also CanadianBar

Assn. v. British Columbia, 2008 BCCA 92, 290 D.L.R. (4th) 617, [2008] B.C.J. No .350 (the
CBA request for leave to appeal to the SCC was denied in July 2008).
160 For purposes of this research project, a comprehensive analysis
of decisions concerning
Charter-basedclaims to legal aid services was prepared as a background paper, available on
request.
161 Prior to these recent judicial decisions concerning legal aid entitlements, several
scholars
argued for recognition of an entrenched constitutional right to legal aid services. Their
arguments were usually grounded in the rule of law as a fundamental constitutional principle.
For example, Patricia Hughes argued that the rule of law implies a constitutional right to
meaningful access to the legal system, and a constitutional right to vindicate rights established
by law. See Patricia Hughes, "A Constitutional Right to Civil Legal Aid" in Making the Case:
The Right to Publicly-FundedLegal Representation in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar

Association, 2002) at 99E; See also Melina Buckley, "The Challenge of Litigating the Rights
of Poor People: The Right to Legal Aid as a Test Case" in Margot Young et al., eds., Poverty:
Rights, Social Citizenship,Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 337 at 342 [Young
et al.] (Buckley argues that a right to legal counsel "inheres in the rule of law" and that "lack
of legal aid reinforces and exacerbates existing inequalities"; as noted, however, courts have
been reluctant to recognize a general constitutional right to state-funded legal counsel; as the
court stated in Christie,the rule of law does not imply such a general constitutional right to
counsel; this decision reflects a reluctance on the part of the courts to establish an abstract
obligation, with potentially wide-ranging ramifications for government expenditures).
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defined by courts as attracting Charter protections are primarily focused on
representation in court proceedings, rather than information, advice, and assistance in
proceedings other than in courts.
Clearly, legal aid priorities must take account of statutory provisions and judicial
decisions that mandate legal protection in defined circumstances. However, in
addition to these obligations, the Charter may apply to legal aid priorities in two
ways. First, Legal Aid Ontario has an obligation to take into consideration Charter
rights, and Charter values, in the process of assessing current priorities and in
formulating new approaches to priorities; in these contexts, it is also necessary to
consider how to implement these obligations most effectively in legal aid delivery
systems. In addition, Legal Aid Ontario has a primary responsibility, as a state actor,
to design a principled and coherent system for the provision of legal aid. Indeed, it is
arguable that the failure on the part of courts to recognize a constitutionally
entrenched right to legal aid requires that LAO fulfill this responsibility, as a
governmental agency with statutory responsibilities, in accordance with principles of
democracy and the rule of law.
In this context, LAO plays a fundamental role in achieving access to justice for
the most vulnerable individuals and communities in Ontario. Both these obligations
must be addressed carefully.
CHARTER VALUES AND EQUALITY GOALS

First, taking account of Charter rights and Chartervalues in defining priorities
for legal aid requires attention to the duty to ensure equality and non-discrimination
pursuant to section 15. As the Supreme Court of Canada declared in G. (J.):
All Charter rights strengthen and support each other and s. 15 plays a
particularly important role in that process. The interpretive lens of
the equality guarantee should therefore influence the interpretation
of other constitutional rights where applicable, and in my opinion,
principles of equality, guaranteed by both s. 15 and s. 28, are a
significant influence on interpreting the scope of protection offered
by s. 7.162
Thus, if the overall purpose of section 15 of the Charter is to promote
substantive equality, this purpose requires that legal aid programs be designed to
remedy social disadvantage. In this context, a legal aid program that gives priority to
equality interests must choose its priorities for service to achieve this goal of
remedying social disadvantage: for example, in relation to aboriginal and racialized
minorities who experience disadvantage in the criminal justice system, or in relation
to women who experience disadvantage in family relations as a result of family
breakdown.
16 2 New

Brunswick (Ministerof Health & Community Services) v G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46,
177 D.L.R. (4th) 124 at para. 112 [G. (J.) cited to S.C.R.] [emphasis added].
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In addition, the need to take account of equality values in the Charter may
necessitate a review of traditional principles about legal aid, particularly where cases
have tended to grant priority if the state is one party to the proceedings, on the basis
of inequality of power for an unrepresented litigant. As David Dyzenhaus argued
persuasively, power imbalances per se should attract this priority; and as a result,
inequality between private parties also necessitates representation. As Dyzenhaus
suggested:
[O]ne's position of inequality is worsened when one is contesting the
law with another private actor who is vastly more powerful than
oneself. What should matter is not the source of the power which
worsens one's situation of63inequality before the law, but the fact that
the situation is worsened.
Family law is a prime example of an area of "private" law in which there may be
an inequality of power, but others include employment, tenancy, and human rights
laws; in all these cases, an unrepresented litigant may be required to challenge a
corporate employer, a corporate landowner, or a government or private sector
employer.
In addition to its relevance for challenging the lack of funds for family law
matters, by contrast with criminal law cases, equality principles may necessitate legal
aid services for persons with mental and physical dis/abilities and persons claiming
immigration or refugee status. 164 These persons may need legal aid to access a
variety of income support benefits, to confront discrimination in employment,
housing and other facilities, or to challenge legal proceedings concerning committal
or involuntary treatment. In this way, the negative liberty test may need to be
expanded beyond criminal law to other contexts, including involuntary
institutionalization, deportation, and the removal of children from parental custody.
In addition, interpreting the protection for life in section 7 through an equality
lens may include interests related to the quality of life: basic material necessities,
such as food and shelter, and basic necessities of social citizenship, such as effective
opportunities to participate in the social and political life of the community. In this
way, legal aid priorities should be designed to achieve the goal of creating
meaningful equality of access to legal services, questioning which individuals and
groups benefit from choices about priorities, how such choices foster access to justice
in relation to law, and what social interests are protected by these choices?

Dyzenhaus, "Normative Justifications for the Provision of Legal Aid" in Blueprint
report (vol 2), supra note 1 at 475 [emphasis added].
'64 Mary Jane Mossman & Cindy L. Baldassi, "A Constitutional Right to Civil Legal Aid in
Canada" in Making the Case: The Right to Publicly-FundedLegal Representation in Canada
(Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 2002) at 149E-150E.
163 David
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THE STATE'S OBLIGATION TO PROMOTE "ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A PRIMARY

ROLE FOR LAO
In addition to the equality lens, this paper argues that the existence of
governmental intervention in the regulation of social relations requires provision of
legal aid in accordance with Chartervalues, and that these services must be provided
beyond the requirements of negative liberty. 165 This argument claims that even if the
state is not a party to the proceeding, statutory regulation of social relations on the
part of governments means that the proceedings no longer constitute merely "private"
action. As the Supreme Court of Canada stated in 2001, quoting Dean PW Hogg,
there is no a priori definition of what constitutes the "private sphere"; rather, "[t]he
boundaries ...are marked ... by the absence of statutory or other governmental
intervention ... If, by investigating the effects of a statute that regulates this sphere,
this Court is imposing 'positive' obligations on the state, that is only because such
imposition is justified in the circumstances."' 6 6 Thus, in regulating social relations
through statutory rights and obligations, the state has a duty to ensure that those
affected are equally able to engage effectively with the legal processes for enforcing
their rights and discharging their obligations. This state obligation has been assigned
by the Legal Aid Services Act to Legal Aid Ontario.
Recognizing a broader range of social interests warranting the benefit and
protection of legal aid, and taking account of the values of equality, liberty and life,
increase the scope of priorities for legal aid funding. In addition, this approach
necessitates recognition of the principles of fundamental justice. In judicial
interpretation of this requirement, courts have adopted a test that focuses on the
nature of the interest at stake, the seriousness and complexity of the proceeding, and
the ability of the person involved to represent themselves effectively in the absence
of state-funded counsel.167 This test suggests a focus on the overall context, requiring
an assessment of the concrete impact on the individual with respect to the social
interest affected, in addition to recognition of inequality of power between the parties
to the legal process.
IDEAS FOR ONTARIO: THE OVERALL IMPACT OF THE CHARTER IN RELATION
TO LEGAL AID
Overall, this assessment of the impact of the Charter suggests that judicial
decisions must be taken into account in defining legal aid priorities, but that these
requirements represent only a starting point.
1. The statutory creation of governmentalprogramssuch as legal aid must meet
a higher, proactive, and more comprehensive standardthan that developed by the
Blueprint report, supra note 1 at 159; See also Francis Regan, "Criminal Legal Aid: Does

165

Defending Liberty undermine Citizenship?" in Young & Wall, Access to CriminalJustice,
supra note 121 at 70.
166 Dunmore v. Ontario (A.G.), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, 207 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at
29 [Dunmore] [emphasis in original].
para.
167G. (J.), supra note 162 at 52-53.
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courts in an incremental fashion. Indeed, the state's obligation must ensure that legal
aid services foster fundamental constitutional values, including the rule of law and
democratic participation, as well as equality. In this way, the courts' Charter
decisions about legal aid services provide only a minimal set of requirements for
legal aid priorities.
2. In this context, the values of equality, liberty, life and the right to participate
in proceedings that are fundamentally just, values that are embedded in the Charter,
establish a responsibilityfor Legal Aid Ontario to implement measures to accord
with these values in order to discharge governmental responsibilityfor intervention
in the regulationof social relations.
Thus, in implementing its responsibility, LAO should ensure that Chartervalues
are achieved in designing processes for choosing priorities, in identifying the content
of these priorities, and in implementing them with appropriate delivery methods.

PART III GOALS FOR LEGAL AID PRIORITIES
1. UNDERSTANDING LEGAL AID IN THE LEGAL SERVICES (JUSTICE SYSTEM)
CONTEXT

[A] new model for priority-setting within the legal aid system should
be based on consultation, environmental scanning of needs, a
blending of system-wide and local strategic planning for the system,
and the integration of a range of service-delivery models into
priority-setting exercises.... [The] range of considerationstaken into
account in setting prioritiesneeds to be less dominated by afocus on
the liberty of the subject and to be more inclusive of the variety of
other interests that create serious needs for legal services.... [The]
system should enhance its capacity to determine its priorities
strategically in order to achieve the greatest impact possible with
available resources. Finally, we have noted that priority-setting must
be subject to revision in• the
.168light of experience and the changing
environment.
social and legal
In recommending this model for defining legal aid priorities, the Blueprint
report articulated a more proactive approach than in the past, both in terms of seeking
information about the range of needs for legal aid services and in terms of assessing
the factors to be taken into account. In addition, the report identified the significance
of experience in the provision of legal aid services and of changing social and legal
environments, and the need for ongoing revision of priorities in the light of these
factors. In this way, the report envisaged a process for defining legal aid priorities
168

Blueprintreport, supra note 1 at 139 [emphasis added].
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that would be active rather than passive in efforts to define the need for legal aid, that
would take into account broader developments in legal and social services, and that
would create systems for monitoring the relationship between needs and services, and
revise them as necessary.
Clearly, such a process for defining priorities also creates new and different
responsibilities for Legal Aid Ontario in managing its funds effectively.
A BROAD VIEW OF LAW IN SOCIETY

This model for defining legal aid priorities starts from a broad view of the law,
including processes for enacting statutes as well as for enforcement and dispute
resolution.
Although a formal hearing in a court represents the traditional model of the
adversary system, law and legal processes are used in administrative decisions,
negotiated or mediated settlements, restorative justice and diversion programs,
tribunal hearings, and other settings that do not involve formal hearings in courts. As
a result, it may be necessary to consider the nature of different kinds of legal
proceedings where legal aid might be provided, and to assess how they work in
169
practice.
In addition, individuals or groups become involved in legal proceedings in
different ways: sometimes, they choose to engage in legal action, but in other cases,
they become involved because of the initiative of someone else.
Significantly, the ability of individuals to engage with law and legal processes is
often directly related to their economic circumstances. As Janet Mosher argued,
rights may be unenforceable because of lack of knowledge and because of the lack of
means to enforce them; in addition, "rights also go unenforced7 0because they are
disregarded by bureaucracies charged with their implementation."'
On this basis, an assessment of legal aid priorities requires an understanding of
the role of law in society, and the particular ways in which law may impact on poor
or vulnerable individuals for whom legal aid may be critical. In this context, there are
several features that have contributed to greater complexity for law, with a
consequential impact on those who are most vulnerable and disadvantaged.
INCREASING LEGALIZATION AND CRIMINALIZATION

One important factor affecting law's role in society is increasing legalization,
and particularly criminalization, of social relations. Clearly, if new legal rights or
responsibilities are created by legislatures or judicial decisions, the need for legal aid
may also increase. As Marc Galanter explained in relation to a comparison of the
legal world in the 1960s and in the late 1980s, "there are now more lawyers, more
169Patricia Hughes & Mary Jane Mossman, "Re-Thinking Access to Criminal Justice in
Canada: A Critical Review of Needs and Responses" (2002) 13 Windsor Rev. Legal and Soc.
Issues
1.
170Janet Mosher, "Poverty Law: A Case Study" in Blueprint report (vol 3), supra note 1 at
925 [Mosher, "Poverty Law].
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claims, more strategic players of the law game, and more expenditure, both
absolutely and proportionately, on law ... and more rules and standards are being
applied by more participants to more varied situations ... ,,171 Similarly, David Wall
compared the number of statutes and regulations enacted in the period from the 1950s
to the 1990s in the United Kingdom; although he concluded that the numbers had
remained fairly constant, the length of statutes and regulations had tripled. In
practice, therefore, procedural complexity increased considerably, thereby increasing
with respect to rights and duties for individuals,
the need for legal 7 assistance
2
including legal aid. 1
The Blueprint report in Ontario documented legal changes that necessitated
increased legal aid services as a result of federal amendments to the Immigration Act
which changed the refugee determination process; 173 as well, changes in entitlement
to provincial social assistance resulted in an increase in the number of social
174
assistance recipients, and thus increased the pool of potential legal aid applicants.
Moreover, significant changes in provincial family laws have continued to create
increased levels of need for family law services, for legal aid clients as for others
involved in relationship breakdown. 175 In the same way, statutory amendments
providing for more legal intervention in matters of child protection affect the
numbers of such cases before the courts; and for parents who are poor, such changes
also create needs for legal aid. 176 Thus, the expansive use of law in recent decades
has created quantitative changes with respect to the nature and volume of legal aid
which may be needed.
A particular issue is the use of the criminal law to respond to societal problems.
As Wall pointed out in the United Kingdom context, "state-driven prosecution
policies largely determine the size of the demand for criminal legal aid." 177 Although
he reported that prosecution rates were tempered in the early 1990s as a result of the
use of diversion processes, successive waves of reform statutes then created new
Marc Galanter, cited in David Wall, "Legal Aid, Social Policy, and the Architecture of
Criminal Justice: The Supplier Induced Inflation Thesis and Legal Aid Policy" (1996) 23:4
J.L. & Soc'y 549 at 556-558 [Wall, "Legal Aid"].
172 Ibid at 557.
173 Blueprintreport, supra note 1 at 25.
174 Ibid at 22-23 (the report also identified social changes, particularly rising levels of
unemployment, which resulted in more eligible clients on the basis of income guidelines).
175 Brenda Cossman & Carol Rogerson, "Case Study in the Provision of Legal Aid: Family
Law" in Blueprint report (vol 3), supra note I at 773. The duration of marriages has also
continued to decline. See Vanier Institute of the Family, Profiling Canada'sFamiliesH
(Ottawa: Vanier Institute of the Family, 2000) at 48, 52.
17

176 The Child and Family Services Act was amended to create authority for earlier and swifter

intervention to remove children at risk, following the report of the Panel of Experts on Child
Protection (Ontario), Protecting Vulnerable Children (Toronto: Ministry of Community and
Social Services, 1998) (the standard for intervention was changed from "substantial risk of
harm" to "likelihood of risk of harm.").
177 Wall, "Legal Aid", supranote 171 at 557.
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needs for advice. 178 In Ontario, Alan Young suggested that there has been a
noticeable pattern of criminalization in the past century: "The discovery of a new
social problem has tended to result in the criminalization of the conduct without
problem could be solved, or contained, through other
consideration of whether 1the
79
control."'
state
of
methods
The Blueprint report specifically identified the impact on criminal legal aid of a
number of changes in criminal law and procedure: expansion of the Crown's duty to
disclose evidence to an accused (resulting in the need for additional preparation time
for defence counsel), court rulings effectively requiring the provision of twenty-four
hour duty counsel, new standards for admissible evidence in sexual assault cases,
increased prosecutions of sexual and domestic assault and impaired driving, zero
tolerance for school disputes, increased street-level drug enforcement, and procedural
amendments to the Criminal Code relating to persons found unfit to
and substantive
80
stand trial. 1
In this way, governmental decisions to use criminal law and enforcement
processes may directly impact on the need for legal aid services. In this context,
Doug Ewart recommended consideration of needs for legal aid in the design of
criminal law measures:
[We should think about considering] all the financial costs of using
the criminal sanction. Thus ... the approximate cost per prosecution
for various types of routinely prosecuted cases could be determined
on an all-in basis - police investigation and processing time, Crown
time, court and judicial time, probation and incarceration and parole
time and defence time. Once this was known in even general terms, a
rough sense of the cost of using the criminal justice system to
respond to various kinds of problems could be used to help assess
between it and other
priorities within the justice system, and indeed
18
responses to that particular social problem. 1
Such an approach reveals how legal aid services are part of the overall justice
system. Moreover, in Ewart's view, Legal Aid Ontario's expertise should be utilized
to identify alternative ways of dealing with social problems outside the justice
system, and it should offer advice on the restructuring of the justice system to reduce
the need for legal representation and its cost. In this way, he argued that Legal Aid
Ontario should play an active role in the design of legal processes to reduce the need
Ibid. (Wall cited the CriminalJusticeAct 1991, the CriminalJustice Act 1993, and the
CriminalJustice and Public OrderAct 1994. as the statutes which were reformed).
179 Alan Young, "Legal Aid and Criminal Justice in Ontario" in Blueprintreport (vol 2), supra
note 1 at 666.
18Blueprint report, supra note 1 at 26; See also R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199, 74 D.L.R.
(4th) 355.
181Ewart, supra note 1 at 11.
17
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for legal aid. Although he was writing in the midst of severe budget constraints in the
mid 1990s, his suggestion that Legal Aid Ontario take the initiative in proposing
changes in legal processes to improve the justice system remains persuasive,
particularly because it seems that needs for legal aid will almost always be greater
than available resources.
INCREASING NUMBERS AND ROLES OF LEGAL ACTORS

A second factor relating to broader issues about legal services, and their impact
on legal aid, concerns changes in the roles and personnel involved in the provision of
legal services. Although early analyses of legal aid identified its transformation from
"charity" to "entitlement", characterizing the earlier development of lawyers' pro
.
•
182 ,
bono services as insufficient and ultimately demeaning, the reduction in available
legal aid services in Canada and elsewhere has resulted in an increasing reliance on
pro bono services once again. 183 As a number of commentators have suggested, the
number of unrepresented litigants has been increasing; some of these litigants choose
to represent themselves (the self-represented), but for many others, legal aid is
unavailable (the unrepresented). 18 4 Nonetheless, in both cases, the presence of
unrepresented litigants may thwart the efficient processes of courts. Indeed, as a
study of the impact of unrepresented litigants in the Family Court of Australia
reported, "matters might have been resolved with help from lawyers, documents
85
would have been better presented, and matters would not have taken as long." 1
In such a context, it is arguable that professional pro bono schemes may be
particularly helpful. However, such schemes may depend on ideas about legal
professionalism in a context in which, as some commentators in the United Kingdom
have argued, such ideas are undergoing major transformation as a result of new
governmental policies for delivering legal aid. 186 In an assessment of the rise of pro
182 See e.g. Mauro Cappelletti & James Gordley, "Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Variations"
(1972) 24 Stan. L. Rev. 347 at 361-362.
183 Francis Regan, "Legal Aid Without the State: Assessing the Rise of ProBono Schemes"
(2000) 33:2 U.B.C.L. Rev. 383 [Regan, "Legal Aid Without the State"]; See also Robert
Granfield, "The Meaning of Pro Bono: Institutional Variations in Professional Obligations
among
Lawyers" (2007) 41 :1 Law & Soc'y Rev. 113.
184 D.A.Rollie Thompson, "No Lawyer: Institutional Coping with the Self-represented"
(2001- 2002) 19 C.F.L.Q. 455; D.A. Rollie Thompson & Lynn Reierson, "A Practising

Lawyer's Field Guide to the Self-Represented" (2001-2002) 19 C.F.L.Q. 529; Marguerite
Trussler, "A Judicial View of Self-represented Litigants" (2002) 19 C.F.L.Q. 547; AnneMarie Langan, "Threatening the Balance of the Scales of Justice: Unrepresented Litigants in
the Family Courts of Ontario" (2004-2005) 30:1 Queen's L.J. 825.

185 B. Smith, 1998 Study of the Effects of Legal Aid Cuts on the Family Court ofAustralia and
its Litigants:FinalReport (Melbourne: Family Court of Australia Publications Unit, 1999) at
2 cited in Regan, "Legal Aid Without the State", supra note 183 at 390.

186 Hilary Sommerlad, "Criminal Legal Aid Reforms and the Restructuring of Legal

Professionalism" in Young & Wall, Access to CriminalJustice, supra note 121 at 292; see

also Hilary Sommerlad, "I've lost the plot': An Everyday Story of the 'Political' Legal Aid
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bono services as a result of decreases in state funded legal aid, for example, Regan
argued that pro bono "enhances the role of the profession in society, allows young
lawyers to gain experience and can have a positive impact on the profitability of a
firm";18 7 it may also increase public confidence in lawyers and in the legal system. At
the same time, he noted limits on the reach of pro bono services: they may not
address all kinds of needed services; and they tend to be inadequate for servicing the
high volume, routine services needed in criminal, family and civil courts on a daily
basis. In Regan's view, therefore, the solution is to design legal aid and pro bono
services to complement each other, recognizing that the primary responsibilityfor
ensuring access to justice remains with government. 188 In this context, there is clearly
a role for Legal Aid Ontario in designing methods to coordinate pro bono services
and legal aid.
In addition to such changes in lawyers' services, legal services are being
transformed to include other personnel. 189 In the Ontario legal aid context, Ewart
argued that the introduction of limited state funding necessitates the effective use of
diverse skills, including those of paralegals, community legal workers, researchers,
investigators, solicitors, law reform specialists, litigators and others: "The paradigm
would not simply be the dedicated lawyer with a brief to prepare and argue as he or
she thinks best." 190 In this way, new developments in the providers of legal services,
as well as professional participation in pro bono services for poor clients, may affect
the range of legal aid services as well as their modes of delivery.
ALTERNATIVES TO COURTS AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM

A third factor that shapes the need for legal services is the increasing attraction
of alternatives to the adversary system in courts, In this new context, individuals
involved in disputes may choose, or be required to participate in, alternative methods
of dispute resolution, either prior to or as an alternative to using the courts. 191 Thus,
in addition to recognizing a legal problem and deciding to take some form of legal
Lawyer" (2001) 28:3 J. L. & Soc'y 335 [Sommerlad, "'I've lost the plot"']; Michelle S.
Jacobs, "Full Legal Representation for the Poor: The Clash Between Lawyer Values and
Client Worthiness" (2001) 44:2 How. L.J. 257; Stuart Scheingold & Anne Bloom,
"Transgressive cause lawyering: practice sites and the politicization of the professional"
(1998) 5:2/3 International Journal of the Legal Profession 209.
187 Regan, "Legal Aid Without the State", supra note 183 at 398.
188 Ibid at 398-399; See also Law Foundation of New South Wales, Futuredirectionsfor Pro
Legal Services in New South Wales (Sydney: Centre for Legal Process, 2002) at 8.
Bono
189 Christine Parker, Just Lawyers: Regulation andAccess to Justice (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999) at 39.
190 Ewart, supra note 1 at 9.
191
See Macdonald, "Scope, Scale, and Ambitions", supra note 23 at 21-22 (according to
Macdonald, the alternative dispute resolution movement occurred in the second half of the
twentieth century in Canada, with a variety of initiatives designed to "dejudicialize" justice);
See also Laura Nader, "The ADR Explosion - The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal Reform"
(1988) 8 Windsor.Y.B. Access Just. 269.
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action, individuals must also have sufficient knowledge of procedures to negotiate a
myriad of alternatives to traditional litigation. In civil law matters, there are
possibilities of court-annexed mandatory mediation in family law matters and
consensual arbitration in commercial disputes. An array of specialized tribunals,
many of which determine individual rights, may also be available for resolving issues
between individuals (in relation to tenancy matters, for example) or between the state
and an individual (in relation to social assistance, for example). 192 Even in criminal
law matters, governmental initiatives sometimes offer diversion schemes for young
offenders or circle sentencing for aboriginal offenders, or other forms of "restorative
justice". 193 In this context, the need for clients to choose, or sometimes to locate, an
appropriate forum for decision-making may also increase the need for legal aid.
Moreover, as the research undertaken by Hunter in Australia demonstrated, at least in
family law matters, there is a need for monitoring outcomes94 and relative costs in
practice in relation to different methods of dispute resolution. 1
SUMMARY
These three aspects of the larger context for legal services all contribute to the
broader legal and social context within which legal aid is provided. According to the
Blueprint report, it is Legal Aid Ontario, pursuant to its statutory obligations under
the Legal Aid Services Act, which is in the best position to provide leadership in
identifying and initiating appropriate reforms to the justice system. As the report
noted, shifts in the mix of delivery models for legal aid services might accomplish
only limited goals, by contrastwith substantive andproceduralchanges in the justice
system more generally.195 In addition, the report argued that:
[T]he legal aid system occupies a unique vantage point from which
to view the operation of the various elements of the broader justice
system. The large volume and wide diversity of problems and clients
embraced by the legal aid system provide an opportunity to observe
recurring problems in the functioning (and systemic dysfunctions) of
the system, and the cost to the legal aid system by promoting reforms
to the underlying justice system that maximize its efficient and
effective functioning. No other institution or set of individuals in
Ontario, professional or otherwise, possesses, at least potentially,
192 Macdonald,

"Scope, Scale, and Ambitions", ibid at 21-23; Blueprint report, supra note 1

at 100-103.
193

See Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson, eds., RestorativeJustice: InternationalPerspectives

(New York: Criminal Justice Press, 1996); Law Commission of Canada, From Restorative
Justice to TransformativeJustice: Discussion Paper (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada,
1999); Adam Crawford, "Alternatives to Prosecution: Access to, or Exits from, Criminal
Justice" in Young & Wall, Access to CriminalJustice, supra note 121 at 313.
194 Hunter "Adversarial Mythologies", supra note 97.
'95 Blueprintreport, supranote 1 at 91 [emphasis added].
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this body of systemic information or this acuteness of incentives. This
legal aid system to
combination of characteristics ideally equips the
96
agent.1
change
proactive
a
as
play a major role

In the context of this paper's concern for understanding and comparing priorities
for legal aid, there is a mandatefor LAO to provide leadership in promoting reforms
to the justice system as a whole, to monitor changes in justice system processes and
their impact on vulnerable and disadvantaged communities, and to develop delivery
systems and programs to meet access to justice goals.
2. LEGAL AID AND LEGAL "NEEDS"
RESEARCH ABOUT LEGAL "NEEDS"

Much current debate about access to justice is either mere unthinking
or consciously polemical repetition of cant. If we don't really know
the legal needs of the public, and if ... we don't even know how we
might go about conducting a needs assessment, and if ... we don't
have any comparative baselines ... how can we possibly make

demonstrable affirmations about the problem and its solutions?
Merely gathering raw statistics is not enough. One also needs to have
are meant to show and how they
a theory of what the 9statistics
7
should be interpreted.1
DEFINING LEGAL AID NEEDS: AN EVOLUTION

As noted earlier in this paper, when state-funded legal aid was first established
by governments in the middle of the twentieth century, most were designed on the
basis that indigent clients needed the same legal services as those who could afford to
pay for them. As a result, there were no large empirical studies of the poor, nor any
significant investigations about the nature of their legal problems; and policy
decisions generally extended the same legal services to the poor that were already
available to paying clients. 198 Then, fuelled by the War on Poverty in the United
States, this initial view of legal aid was revised to recognize that poor clients
experienced different problems, and that their problems were often multiple and

[emphasis added] (significantly, the report also argues that, by taking up this
leadership role, LAO would acquire a new legitimacy and rationale with residents and
taxpayers;. in addition, the report noted that many justice reforms (such as diversion
measures and case management processes) will work more effectively if litigants are
represented; in this way, LAO's input is critical to these new developments at 91-92).
197 Macdonald, "Scope, Scale and Ambitions", supra note 23 at 103 [emphasis added].
198 See e.g. Joint Committee Report, supra note 31.
96 Ibid
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interrelated; in addition, legal aid was conceptualized in terms of fostering
"empowerment" of the poor.199
At least to some extent, these differing approaches to ideas about "needs" for
legal aid contributed to the tensions in Ontario in the 1970s between the judicare
system and community legal clinics; while judicare certificates created access for
poor persons to the services available to paying clients, community legal clinics
attempted to respond to the different needs of poor clients for legal services (such as
social assistance, workers compensation, and tenancy matters), as well as engaging in
law reform and community development activities designed to achieve systemic
change and community empowerment. Thus, when the Ontario Legal Aid Plan
agreed to fund community legal clinics, poor clients obtained access to legal aid to
meet a range of different kinds of needs.
In more recent decades, some research has focussed on identifying "needs" for
legal services generally. 20 1 In the context of legal aid, some Australian studies in the
1970s suggested that services should be designed based on "social indicators" of
poverty and their potential for contributing to the creation of legal problems. 20 2 In
this context, the social indicators approach required policy makers to define
objectives for a legal aid program and then to identify accurate and accessible
indicators to measure needs for legal aid: for example, rates of unemployment,
geographic isolation, ethnicity, and dependency on welfare. 203
Interestingly, a similar approach of developing "proxies" for need has been
adopted more recently in relation to medical services; however, while proxies have
been utilized with some success in relation to the provision of health services, they
seem less useful with respect to legal services because the level of public knowledge
about health is greater than about law, and people know better how to access health
care than legal services:
The public may not necessarily be aware either that they have a
'legal need' or how to access the particular service that would be
most appropriate for problem resolution. To decide upon and then

199 Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, "The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective" (1964) 73
Yale L.J. 1317.
200 See Clinical Funding Report, supra note 47 at 1; See also Blueprint report, supra note I at
53.
201 See Liz Curran & Mary Anne Noone, "The Challenge of Defining Unmet Legal Need"
(2007) 21 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 63 [Curran & Noone]; Mossman, "Comprehensive Legal Aid",
supra note 155 at 6-14; Blueprint report at 53-66.
202 Austl., Commonwealth, Legal Aid Branch, Social Indicators andthe Delivery of Legal
Services by Peter Hanks, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Services, 1987).
203 Ibid at 49; See also Joel F. Handler & Louise Trubek, "Poor Clients Without Lawyers:
What Can Be Done" (1985-1986) 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 369.
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measure what constitutes 'unmet 20 need'
4
presents somewhat of a conundrum.

in such circumstances

In the legal context, debates about "needs" for legal aid reflect a variety of
different perspectives and purposes, and are often used to justify different kinds of
strategies or policy goals. Indeed, in a society in which law potentially touches
everything, it is difficult to isolate a uniquely legal problem; as a result, "the concept
it's propelled by considerations not of legal
of legal needs is a moving target and ...
definition, but rather of pragmatic benefit and cost." 20 As this comment suggests,
legal needs must be understood as dynamic rather than static, and as interrelated with
other kinds of problems, particularly for those who are poor. At the same time, policy
makers may define "legal needs" to achieve particular political or pragmatic
outcomes. Such factors contribute to the challenge of defining "needs" for legal aid,
and particularly "unmet" needs. Yet, notwithstanding the difficulties, the task of
defining priorities for legal aid services must somehow confront the issue of "needs."
Moreover, it seems clear that different approaches to the issue of needs may affect
of defining priorities and the assumed content of legal aid
both the process
6
priorities.

20

"LEGAL NEEDS" AND "JUSTICIABLE PROBLEMS"

To some extent, the concept of "social exclusion" in Europe and the United
Kingdom appears designed to confront multiple factors which prevent individuals
from participating effectively in the community, although, as Ruth Levitas noted, the
concept of social exclusion has been used in a number of different ways. 20 7 As noted
earlier, the concept of social exclusion in the United Kingdom seems to have been
defined in policy terms to provide more information about law to the public, with the
expectation that individuals will then take responsibility for solving their own
problems; more specifically, there is special emphasis on using information to obtain

a job. This understanding of social exclusion was reflected, for example, in a 2004
government report, which stated:
Assisting people to resolve problems helps to remove the barriers
that prevent people having the opportunity to participate fully in
community life. Many people feel overwhelmed with difficulties 204

Deborah Baker & Stephen Barrow, "Proxy Models of Legal Need: Can they Contribute to

Equity of Access to Justice?" (2006) 35:2 Journal of Social Policy 267 at 269 [citations
omitted].
205 Edward Dauer, "A Wider Notion of Unmet Legal Needs" in Esther F. Lardent, ed., Civil
Justice:An Agendafor the 1990s Papers of the American Bar Association National
Conference on Access to Justice in the 1990s (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1991) at
4.
206 See generally, Curran & Noone, supra note 201.
207Levitas, The Inclusive Society?, supra note 126 at 2-3.
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getting independent advice at the right time is a way out of the
nightmare. It can be the first step towards feeling confident enough
to seek meaningful training and employment and contribute to the
social and economic well being of the area.208
One result of this focus on "social exclusion" is the growth of research projects
in the United Kingdom, designed to document "justiciable problems", with research
based on large-scale interviews about "problem-solving behaviour". In Helen Genn's
early work, for example, a "justiciable event" was defined as "a matter experienced
by a respondent which raised legal issues, whether or not it was recognized by the
respondent as being 'legal' and whether or not any action taken by the respondent to
deal with the event involved the use of any part of the civil justice system."2 09 As a
result of research initiatives in the United Kingdom, there is now some
documentation of the ways that people may experience everyday problems, which
might be resolved by legal advice or legal action. 21 In addition, the research
identifies how problems may "cluster" or "cascade" as a result of a triggering event
such as losing a job, the breakdown of a family relationship, or personal injury.211 In
resources for the provision of
this way, the research is intended to ensure that limited
2 12
distributed.
efficiently
legal aid services are most
A few similar empirical studies have been conducted in Canada. 2 13 In two
studies undertaken by the federal Department of Justice in 2004 and in 2006, for
example, almost half of the respondents reported one or more serious problems with
legal aspects within the previous three years; the most prevalent problems
(experienced by about twenty percent of respondents) were consumer, employment
and debt problems. 2 14 In reflecting on the data obtained in these surveys, Ab Currie
connected the presence of justiciable problems and their lack of resolution to
experiences of social exclusion and poverty, disadvantage and dependency:
Empirical research has demonstrated that the prevalence of
justiciable problems that are serious and difficult to resolve is high,
occurring to about 45% of the Canadian population within any three
year period. The research demonstrates that many problems remain
unresolved after a number of years, that outcomes are frequently
208 Department

for Constitutional Affairs, supra note 137 at 27 [emphasis in original].

20

9Genn, "Paths to Justice", supra note 125 at 12.
210 Ibid; Pascoe Pleasence et al., "Local Legal Need" (January 2001), online: Legal Services

Research Centre <http://Isrc.org.uk/publications/LocalLegalNeed.pdf>; Pleasence, "Causes of
Action", supra note 125.
211 See e.g. Buck, Balmer & Pleasence, supra note 127; Pleasence et al., "Multiple Justiciable
supra note 133.
Problems",
212

Curran & Noone, supra note 201 at 74.

213 See e.g. Currie, "A National Survey", supra note 143.
214 Ibid at

217.
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perceived to be unfair and that the conditions surrounding unresolved
problems often become worse... . There appears to be a momentum
driven
to experiencing increasing numbers of justiciable problems ...

in part by one problem acting as a trigger for others. The problem
clusters ...include not only justiciable problems but also mental

health, physical health and social problems that are triggered by the
justiciable problems. This trigger and cascade effect can bring about
social exclusion, a process of falling away from the mainstream,
from lives of self-sufficiency into lives of disadvantage and
dependency on public support. This cannot be demonstrated by the
data in either of these studies. However, it can be seen in the life
histories of the most vulnerable and socially excluded members of
2 15

society.

Yet, while the existence of unresolved justiciable problems appears to be
connected to the concept of social exclusion, this research has been used
(paradoxically) in the United Kingdom primarily to justify an emphasis on delivering
legal advice. As a result, the research has been primarily focussed on ways of solving
individualproblems.
Research about "justiciable problems" has been criticized by a number of
scholars. For example, Curran and Noone concluded that data about justiciable
problems does not delve sufficiently into "practical impediments for the
marginalized, which can stem from systemic (rather than individual) problems .2I6
In addition, these authors argued that a focus on "justiciable problems" does not
"link issues of problem-solving behaviour to the notions of citizenship and human
rights entitlements and the role of government and its social contract with the
citizenry.,

2 17

Similarly, as Janet Mosher argued at the time of the Blueprint report, although
"the poor" may all share experiences that relate to lack of income, they are not at all a
homogeneous group; low income often intersects with other characteristics which
must be distinguished in determining whether and how legal aid can be effectively
provided: some poor persons are sole support mothers, elderly persons, mentally or
physically disabled, people of colour, refugees or new Canadians, illiterate, poorly
educated, or young persons without financial support who move from the street to

215 Ab

Currie, "Justiciable Problems and Social Exclusion" (Peyresq, Working Group on the
Legal Professions, Research Committee on the Sociology of Law, 2006) at 10; see also
Currie, supra note 49 (Currie identified four vulnerable groups who were likely to fail to
resolve problems because of access barriers to assistance: immigrants, Aboriginal people,
people without high school education, and people with incomes less than $25,000 at 13).
216 Curran & Noone, supra note 201 at 75 (emphasis added).
217 Ibid. (such surveys are also very expensive to conduct, so that there have been few efforts
in Australia to duplicate the research undertaken in the UK).
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shelters and back again.218
Moreover, while poor persons often experience dependence and vulnerability,
many of them view law as a contradictory force in their lives since it may offer
support and protection, but it can also be used to intrude harshly into their lives. In
addition, because the legal problems experienced by poor persons are frequently
multidimensional and systemic, appropriate access to complex legal information may
be difficult to obtain.219
Thus, in responding to the "justiciable problems" of the poor, there are
challenges based on differences in the reasons for their vulnerability, in the need to
provide complex legal information for multiple and intersecting problems, and in
designing systemic approaches to overcome "social exclusion".
BEYOND "JUSTICIABLE PROBLEMS" TO "SOCIAL INCLUSION"

If "legal needs" are defined in terms that go beyond individual problem-solving
in relation to "justiciable problems", by incorporating "notions of citizenship and
human rights entitlements," legal aid for poor citizens may be defined quite
differently. 22 In a paper for the Laidlaw Foundation in 2002, Andrew Mitchell and
Richard Shillington presented arguments about the limitations of the concept of
"social exclusion" and proposed instead a policy focus on goals of "social inclusion."
In explaining the difference between these two concepts, the authors suggested that
the issue is whether governmental
polic[ies should] address failures in existing social and economic
structures that constrain inclusive conditions for all citizens [a "social
inclusion" approach] or, is it the task of policy to integrate the
marginalized into fundamentally just and sound structures [the
"social exclusion" approach]? [According to the authors], [t]he
distinction between the two [approaches] is the difference between
and preventing exclusion - that is, who is required
creating inclusion
22 1
to adjust.",
21

8Mosher, Poverty law, supra note 170 at 914-923; See also Janet E. Mosher, "Welfare

Reform and the Re-Making of the Model Citizen" in Young et al., supra note 161 at 119
;Mosher, "Welfare Reform"]; Alexy Buck et al., "Lone Parents", supra note 133.
19 Mosher, Poverty law, ibid.
220 See Margot Young, "Introduction" in Young et al., supra note 161 at 16 [Young,

"Introduction"] ("The struggle to make Canada a more just and equitable country is not only
for the benefit of those living in poverty. Canada's success or failure to achieve social and
economic justice also affects the quality of life for all who live here" at 16); See also
Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice as a Human Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007); Andrew Ashworth, "Legal Aid, Human Rights and Criminal Justice" in Young &
Wall, Access to CriminalJustice, supranote 121 at 55.
221 Andrew Mitchell & Richard Shillington, Poverty, Inequality andSocial Exclusion,

(Toronto: Laidlaw Foundation, 2002), online: Laidlaw Foundation
<http://www.laidlawfdn .org/sites/default/files/laidlawpublications/working_papers social-in
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Clearly, this shift in perspective is significant: when the emphasis is on "social
exclusion", governmental policies are merely obliged to provide information to
individuals, and individuals are responsible for taking action to overcome their
"social exclusion"; such an approach is consistent with recent governmental policies
,
.... . ,, 222
of "responsabilization . By contrast, goals of "social inclusion" involve a
combination of state actors and participation by individuals and communities to
overcome systemic problems in social and economic arrangements that create
barriers to full participationfor the most vulnerable. Thus, in understanding and

comparing priorities for legal aid, goals of "social inclusion" present important
challenges with respect to the definition of legal "needs"; social inclusion goals
require attention to systemic problems that prevent participationin the community,
not just responses to individualproblems.
RETHINKING THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE "NEEDS"

As S is223 evident, ideas about legal aid "needs" raise fundamental political
questions.
As Nancy Fraser argued more than a decade ago, "needs-talk has been
institutionalized as a major vocabulary of political discourse."'2 24 In her view,
moreover, this "needs-talk functions as a medium for the making and contesting of
political claims," particularly as a result of the turn to neo-liberalism in the late
twentieth century. In this context, ideas about the responsibilities of the state to meet
individual needs have changed substantially. 22 5 As Sylvia Bashevkin argued, neoliberalism "set in motion a series of changes that ... replace the embattled social
Anglo-American welfare states with a
citizenship and entitlement groundings of
22 6
more rigid, obligations-based orientation."
In the legal context, moreover, Margot Young suggested that the state's role has
changed from one of making interventions to assure social justice and individual
clusion/wpsosi_2002_december_poverty-inequality.pdf> at 13 [Mitchell & Shillington]
[emphasis added].
222

See e.g. Christine B. Harrington, Shadow Justice: The Ideology and Institutionalizationof

Alternatives to Courts (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985); David Garland, "The Culture of
High Crime Societies: Some Preconditions of Recent 'Law and Order' Policies" (2000) 40
The British Journal of Criminology 347.
223 See Richard L. Abel, "Law Without Politics: Legal Aid under Advanced Capitalism"
(1985) 32:3 UCLA L. Rev. 474.
224 Nancy Fraser, "Talking about Needs: Interpretive Contests as Political Conflicts in
Welfare-State Societies" (1989) 99:2 Ethics 291 at 291;. see also Nancy Fraser, "Women,
Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation" (1987) Thesis Eleven 88; Nancy Fraser &
Linda Gordon, "Contract versus Charity: Why Is There No Social Citizenship in the United
States?" (1992) 22:3 Socialist Review 45.
225 Fraser, ibid. at 291 and 296-302.
226 Sylvia Bashevkin, Welfare Hot Buttons: Women, Work, and SocialPolicy Reform
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 133; See also Brenda Cossman & Judy
Fudge, eds., Privatization,Law, and the Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2002).
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well-being to one that is responsible only for optimizing conditions under which
individuals can govern themselves. 227 As Young and others argued, these values of
228
More
neo-liberalism undermine fundamental conceptions of "justice as fairness".
pointedly, as Lynn Mather concluded, individual responsibility for self-help is not a
panacea: "for some
•,,229 people and some problems, self-help 'suggests abandonment, not
In this way, an emphasis in legal aid policy on individual
empowerment.
autonomy and opportunities to choose may be all too absent from the lived
experiences of many poor and vulnerable persons resulting in a critical disconnect
between political discourse and social realities.
Thus, in understanding and comparing legal aid priorities, it is critical to take
account of the politics of justice and the ways that different approaches to priorities
may impact on the lives of individuals and their communities. Even recognizing that
does230not preclude the
there are limits to the use of law to achieve social goals
•
,...
In this context,
possibility that law may sometimes challenge social inequalities.
systemic bias
of
impact
the
understand
Ewart argued that legal aid priorities must
against the poor, particularly when poverty is combined with other aspects of
disadvantage; as he suggested, "[t]reating legal aid clients, individually or as a group,
as if they were just rich people without money, or white able-bodied males with a
one-time legal problem, can result in the failure even to see, much less address, the
relevant issues."' 23 1 In addition, Ewart explained the need for legal aid to choose its
cases with a systemic purpose; particularly in a context of inadequate resources,
,,232
services should be deployed "ina structured and strategic way ...
Overall, therefore, even though it is necessary to choose priorities for legal aid
so as to maximize the impact of legal aid funds, it is important to understand Legal
Aid Ontario as the primary guardian of access to justice for the poor and vulnerable
in Ontario, and to affirm LAO's proactive role in achieving systemic goals of "social
inclusion" for these clients.
Young et al., "Introduction", supranote 220 at 8.
228 Ken Norman, "The Charteras an Impediment to Welfare Rollbacks: A Mediation on
227

'Justice as Fairness' as a 'Bedrock Value' of the Canadian Democratic Project" in Young et
al., supra note 161 at 297; See also Tamara Goriely, "Making the Welfare State Work:
Changing Conceptions of Legal Remedies Within the British Welfare State" in Francis Regan
et al, eds., The Transformationof Legal Aid." Comparativeand HistoricalStudies (Oxford:
University Press, 1999) 89.
Oxford
229
Lynn Mather, "Changing Patterns of Legal Representation in Divorce: From Lawyers to
Pro Se" (2003) 30:1 J.L.& Soc'y 137 at 154, as cited in Moorhead & Pleasence, "Access to
Justice", supra note 51 at 8; Jeff Giddings & Michael Robertson, "Large-scale Map or the AZ? The Place of Self-Help Services in Legal Aid" (2003) 30:1 J.L. & Soc'y 102 at 115.
230 See e.g. Harry Glasbeek, "Looking Back toward a Bleak Future for Lawyers" (2001) 19
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 263; Bruce Porter, "Claiming Adjudicative Space: Social Rights,
Equality and Citizenship" in Young et al., supra note 161, at 77; Melina Buckley, ed.,
Transforming Women's Future (Vancouver: West Coast LEAF, 2001).
231 Ewart, supra note 1 at 9.
232 ibid
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3. A SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE: LAO AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A central tenet of the McCamus Report is that the legal aid system
must be regarded as an integral component of the overall justice
system in Ontario. The Report emphasized that in envisioning an
improved model for the delivery of legal aid the existing justice
system should not be viewed as static ... The Report concluded that

for legal reform efforts to be successful, there must be an ongoing
focus on incremental change through continuous design,
experimentation, implementation, and evaluation exercises. 23 3
As this quotation from the Trebilcock Report suggested, the Blueprint report
recommended a major role for legal aid in the overall justice system in Ontario; it
also recognized that legal aid services should not remain static, and emphasized a
need for incremental change through experimentation and evaluation.
Such recommendations provide some concrete direction with respect to legal aid
priorities in Ontario.
A conception of legal aid as an important element in the overall justice system
suggests that priorities should be defined in terms of overall goals of the justice
system, pursuant to fundamental values including democracy, equality, and the rule
of law. Such a conception may include principles and procedures for resolving
disputes and law enforcement, but it may also address broader systemic concerns with
respect to legal and social inequality.
A conception of legal aid as dynamic rather than static also necessitates an
ongoing system for measuring and evaluating the impact of choices with respect to
priorities, and initiatives to respond to them more effectively. In doing so, it is
possible that initiatives to address problems may involve efforts to seek reforms to
the law and to court procedures to achieve systemic changes, rather than modest
adjustments to priorities for individual legal aid services.
Thus, in reflecting on service priorities, it is essential to understand that the
definition of a problem in the delivery of legal aid is merely a first step; there may be
a number of different responses to the problem. As a result, the process of defining
priorities also involves considerations about how to respond in ways that are most
helpful to clients and cost-effective for legal aid funds.
LAO AND THE PROVISION OF LEGAL INFORMATION

In this context, the Trebilcock report suggested a role for Legal Aid Ontario in
coordinating the dissemination of information about legal rights and processes.234
This recommendation appears quite similar to the New Zealand proposal to identify a
233 Trebilcock

234 Ibid

Report, supra note 7 at 11.
at 95-96.

206

Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues

Vol. 29

"lead agency" to provide legal information to the public. 235 Efforts to create and
coordinate websites, hotlines and other means of providing basic information are
desirable in two ways
As the Trebilcock report noted, one benefit is that such efforts may offer legal
information to the middle class who must support legal aid through their taxes. 236 A
second benefit is that the availability of legal information may operate to provide
legal problems, or at least in constraining the scope
early intervention in preventing
237
impact.
negative
of their
In similar ways, the Legal Services Commission in the United Kingdom has
focused a great deal of energy and resources on the provision of legal information to
the general public, emphasizing individual responsibility for acting on this advice to
overcome "social exclusion". As Levitas noted, however, the impact of British
policies to overcome social exclusion remains unclear, and there is some evidence
may preclude the success of individuals'
that structural inequalities,,. within
,, 238
.
. society
.
efforts to overcome "social exclusion . In this context, the provision of legal
information (and significant reliance on technology to do so, as in the United States)
may be of little assistance in overcoming systemic barriers for the poorest and most
vulnerable individuals. For them, more proactive assistance may be necessary.
Thus, in exploring ideas about priorities for legal aid, it is important to identify
differences amongpotential individuals and communities, some of whom may benefit
from generic legal information available in a number of formats (brochures, websites,
etc), while others may need more sustained educational programs at which the
information is provided in a more interactive format.
For more disadvantaged individuals, however, advice that is engaged and fully
interactive in relation to individual problems will be necessary, particularly where
individuals suffer from mental illness, experience difficulty with dominant languages
or writing, or where there are multiple problems (legal or other) involved.
In addition, the ability to utilize telephone or computer hotlines may differ for
individuals seeking information or advice about legal problems.
ACCESS TO LEGAL INFORMATION AND ADDRESSING SYSTEMIC ISSUES

In this context, the recommendation of the Trebilcock report to expand the range
of potential recipients of legal aid to the middle class raises important issues about
how to define priorities for the use of scarce resources, both with respect to the kinds
of services to be offered and in relation to the potential clients to be served. In
addition, it is important to acknowledge that both the Blueprint report and the
Trebilcock Report focus on the provision of "legal services" in relation to law
DeliveringJusticefor All, supra note 103 at 13-15.
Report, supra note 7 at 75-81.
237 Ibid. at 87-96 (the report reviewed arrangements for advice centres and other methods of
providing basic legal information to the public).
238 Levitas, supra note 126 at 229; See also Curran & Noone, supra note 201.
235

236 Trebilcock
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enforcement (criminal law) and private dispute resolution (family and civil law). In
doing so, they do not take account of the significance of public and administrative
law for many poor citizens.
The Blueprint report and the Trebilcock Report also do not fully recognize the
well-established role of community legal clinics with respect to law reform initiatives
and community development activities, features that suggest a need to consider group
legal services and initiatives designed to address systemic poverty issues.
Example: One example of this kind of "legal service" was described by Dianne
Martin in response to a number of cases being presented to a community legal clinic,
in which Canadian-born children were denied access to schools and to health benefits
because of their parents' irregular or undocumented immigration status. The clinic
developed a reform strategy that involved legal research, education workshops and
lobbying of professionals (including health care practitioners and immigration
assistance workers and organizations), education and outreach to the parents in ways
that took account of their legal and social vulnerability, and political lobbying. In
adopting this strategy to solve a widespread problem in the community, the clinic
was able to accumulate the "evidence" that might be needed to launch a test case, but
was postponed until all other avenues for solving this problem
this litigation strategy
239
exhausted.
had been
In this context, it is critical to understand the impact of systemic "legal
and
services," and how the work of community legal clinics differs in both substance2 40
process from individual law enforcement and other dispute resolution "services"
Ewart's recommendations for a systemic approach to legal aid services offers
another example, beyond the role of community legal clinics, of a proactive legal aid
initiative to deal with bail applications.
Example: Based on data collected by the Commission on Systemic Racism,
Ewart recommended the services of paralegals with specialized training to assist incustody applicants for bail - to assemble information and liaise with family members
and others in order to speed up the process for the client, and avoid unnecessary
remands and delays in the court proceedings. Ewart also approved the Commission's

239

Departament of Justice Canada, A Seamless Approach to Service Delivery in Legal Aid.

Fulfillinga Promise or Maintaininga Myth? by Dianne Martin (Ottawa: Department of

Justice Canada, 2002) at 15-16.
240 See Trebilcock Report, supra note 7 at 108 (the systemic role of legal aid services in
community legal clinics must be taken into account in assessing the recommendation of the
Trebilcock Report to change the clinics' mandate so as to make them the entry point for legal
information, advice and referrals; clearly, in the absence of significant additional funding,
such a change in mandate would preclude this creative legal activity on behalf of some of the
most vulnerable individuals).
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in large urban centres, and
recommendation to introduce twenty-four hour bail courts
24 1
hearings.
bail
in
technology
for
role
suggested a greater
Such examples demonstrate how a priority setting process requires a proactive
role on the part of Legal Aid Ontario, and active consideration of all the options,
including the need to target systemic barriers using innovative reforms, and by
monitoring results on an ongoing basis as new information and new possibilities
develop.
Thus, like the Blueprint report in 1997 and, to some extent, the Trebilcock report
in 2008, this paper assumes a creative and proactive role for LAO.

PART IV.
COMPARING AND UNDERSTANDING
PRIORITIES

LEGAL AID

1. INTRODUCTION
Access to the legal system is properly characterized as a systemic
matter and not merely one which may be a problem for individuals.
As with any right or interest, some individuals will need to claim it
more than others, but it is ... fundamental to our existence as citizens
... Once lack of access is seen as a systemic "problem," it is more
likely that it will be understood that it requires a systemic solution.
This does not automatically mean a particular form of legal aid, but
legal access42 programs which deliver a variety of services as
2
appropriate.
This section explores three approaches to legal aid priorities. Traditionally, legal
aid services were offered to eligible clients according to categories of legal claims or
processes. 24 3 In this context, recent discussion about defining legal aid priorities in
the context of "capped" services may be somewhat misleading. In fact, whether or
not the overall legal aid budget was "capped" or "uncapped", statutory schemes in
Ontario, beginning with the 1966 statute, have always defined priorities for the
services to be provided, excluding some services altogether and making others
available only on a discretionary basis. In this respect at least, changes in budgetary
arrangements have not altered the longstanding practice in Ontario of defining
priorities for legal aid in terms of "legal categories" of entitlement.
241 Ewart, supra note I at 24-25.
242 Patricia Hughes, "New Brunswick (Minister

of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.):
En Route to More Equitable Access to the Legal System?"(2000) 15 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 93 at
113.
243 Joint Committee Report, supra note 31.
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However, using legal categories as the basis for defining priorities for legal aid
may tend to allocate available funding without sufficient regard for differences
among legal aid applicants and the relative impact on clients of a grant or denial of
legal aid. This paper examines two other approaches to defining legal aid priorities:
one approach would assess the significance of the problem to an individual client in
terms of patterns of "social exclusion"; while a different, but related, approach might
the need to foster goals of "social inclusion" for
take account of systemic barriers and
2 44
individual clients or communities.
While these approaches must not ignore Charter requirements, as noted in Part
II above, some approaches may better permit the use of Chartervalues to encourage
a more principled approach to the provision of this significant societal resource in
order to confront systemic barriers to equality.
Thus, this Part reviews three approaches to legal aid priorities, explaining how
each might lead to different ways of understanding legal aid priorities:
a "legal categories" approach;
a "legal needs / social exclusion" approach; and
a "social inclusion / systemic" approach.
2. A "LEGAL CATEGORIES" APPROACH
"LEGAL CATEGORIES" AS A TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO LEGAL AID
PRIORITIES

In general, a legal categories approach offers legal aid to eligible clients for
representation in proceedings before the courts. Although it is possible that clients
may obtain some advice in relation to a legal problem, the main purpose of
"categorical" legal aid is representation in a legal proceeding: criminal, family, or
other civil matter. In this way, the legal categories approach emphasizes legal
representation, rather than advice or information services; in addition, it tends to offer
legal aid only at a late point in the development of a problem, rather than preventing
its escalation through early intervention or education.
The legal categories approach reflects traditional goals of legal aid: to offer the
same services to eligible legal aid clients that are available to paying clients, using a
judicare model in which the same lawyers offer services to both paying clients and
legal aid clients. However, the need to use scarce resources effectively in providing
legal aid, and the need to ensure that legal aid clients were not receiving more than a
reasonable paying client would obtain, resulted in limitations on the services offered
to legal aid clients; by contrast, paying clients may have more and better access to
holistic legal services.

244

Ewart, supra note 1 at 16-19; See also Mitchell & Shillington, supra note 221.

210

Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues

Vol. 29

Example #1: As research on justiciable problems has demonstrated, the dissolution of
a marriage or cohabiting relationship may be a "triggering event" which leads to
additional problems, such as issues about housing and debt.2 45 However, if legal aid
is available only for formal representation in family law cases, it is likely that the
related legal issues of housing and debt relief may not be addressed, and that other
(social) problems, such as the client's need to find new arrangements for child care,
will also be beyond the scope of legal aid services. Particularly where services are
capped in terms of available hours, or provided with block funding, measures which
tend to reduce the time available to respond to client needs holistically and lawyers
offering family law legal aid services may not be able to offer assistance beyond
achieving a settlement of the family law issues. Thus, all the client's additional legal
and social issues remain unaddressed. As a result, as the research on "justiciable
problems" suggests, these problems will likely "cluster" or "cascade" into larger
legal problems later on.
In this context, it would be helpful to have more data with respect to the recent
evaluation report concerning the LAO Family Law Office. According to the
evaluation report, FLO offices adopted different approaches to the provision of
family law legal aid. Thus, while the office in Ottawa stringently limited its family
legal aid services to those that were available to lawyers with certificates, the report
found that the Toronto office tried to respond to the "needs" of family law legal aid
clients. Unfortunately, the report did not specify the content of these additional client
"needs," but it is possible to speculate that FLO lawyers in the Toronto office may
have tried to respond to "clustered" justiciable problems more holistically. Certainly,
client satisfaction with the services of the Toronto FLO was higher than in other
offices.
Thus, it would be useful to know what additional needs were met in the Toronto
FLO, and whether its approach prevented the escalation of other legal problems that
might otherwise have "cascaded." The evaluation report concluded that the activities
of the Toronto FLO raised concerns about the cost of the "enriched" service provided
in its office. 2 4 6 It seems clear that a more comprehensive cost/benefit analysis, taking
into account the outcomes achieved,
might reveal cost savings by avoiding
"cascading" problems in the future. 24 7
One peculiar aspect of the legal categories approach is the effort to include the
work of community legal clinics ("clinic law") in the Legal Aid Services Act. This
characterization of clinic work ignores the fundamental nature of legal aid work in
community clinics. Particularly because a clinic's Board of Directors has
245 Currie, "A National Survey", supra note 143 at 226; Genn, "Paths to Justice"supranote

125 at 31-32.
Meredith & Peggy Malpass, "Evaluation of the Legal Aid Ontario, Pilot Project Staff

246 Colin

Family Law Offices: Final Report" (8 August 2002) at 113, online: Legal Aid Ontario

<http://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/publications/downloads/reportFLOevaluation_02aug.pdf>.
247 Trebilcock Report, supra note 7 at 80, 104.
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responsibility for defining priorities for the work of the clinic, including both
individual services and more systemic activities to promote equality for poor and
vulnerable communities, the "fit" between the work of community clinics (mandated
by Boards) and the "legal categories" approach in the statutory definition of "clinic
law" is awkward and perhaps somewhat unworkable. 24 8 Moreover, the statute seems
to go beyond defining legal categories to include definitions of the providers of legal
of legal aid
aid services, an approach which exacerbates the problem of "silos" 249
Report.
Trebilcock
the
in
contexts
different
slightly
in
identified
services
LIMITATIONS
PRIORITIES

OF THE

LEGAL CATEGORIES APPROACH TO DEFINING

Clearly, the focus of a legal categories approach is the legal matter facing a
client, rather than the potential impact of the problem on the client. According to this
approach, eligible clients with criminal law, family law, clinic law and mental health
law problems may qualify for legal aid services. 25 In this context, the legislation
does not require an assessment of the importance of the matter for an individual
client, although significantly, the statute does not preclude such an assessment. The
possibility of assessing the impact of a legal problem on an individual client was
addressed in the Blueprint report with respect to the principle of negative liberty
which has traditionally accorded "categorical" priority for legal aid services in
criminal law matters where an accused faces a risk of incarceration. As the report
argued:
Example #2: "[A] young adult charged with a first offence who has difficulty
communicating and for whom a conviction might result in a loss of employment and
other negative consequences that may flow from acquiring a criminal record may
appear to make a stronger claim for legal aid than someone who has been convicted
several times before, faces an overwhelming (sic) and uncomplicated case, is able to
a short
communicate and knowledgeable about the justice system, and risks only
' 25 1
troubled."
particularly
not
is
she
or
he
which
about
period of incarceration
Clearly, this argument suggests that, in determining priorities for legal aid
services, it may be appropriate not just to utilize legal categories for such services,
Legal Aid Services Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 26, s. 2 (the statute creates a new category of
"clinic" legal services, defined as "areas of law which particularly affect low-income
individuals or disadvantaged communities," and including a number of legal matters such as
housing, income maintenance, social assistance, human rights, health, employment and
education;. note, however, the definition of "legal aid services" in section 2, which may
"other" services as well).
encompass
249 Trebilcock
Report, supranote 7 at 103-104.
248

250

Legal Aid Services Act, supranote 248 at s. 12(2).

Blueprint report, supra note 1 at 71 (note that this example also uses ideas about "early
intervention" in the criminal law context).

251
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but also to adopt measures to assess the impact of the matter on the individualclient.
To some extent, this approach reflects Australia's definitions, using both categorical
This
priorities and "special circumstances" in defining entitlement to legal aid.
approach is reviewed in more detail later.
A second limitation of the legal categories approach to defining priorities is that
it tends to individualize cases rather than recognizing systemic problems for some
individuals within the justice system.
Example #3: In the criminal law context, there is evidence that many accused
persons (perhaps forty percent) suffer from mental illness and/or addiction. While
there are now a number of specialized mental health courts, and a newly-established
women's court for accused women with problems of addiction, the fact that a high
proportion of accused persons suffer from mental illness and/or addiction may
require a more systemic solution rather than the (repeated) provision of
individualized legal aid services for accused persons whose problems result from
illness rather than criminality. 253 Although more consultation is needed to determine
the precise shape of a systemic approach to legal aid for these accused persons, data
about repeat offenders in this category could provide evidence of potential cost
savings with a systemic response.
Example #4: Similarly, systemic approaches may be more useful than the provision
of individual categorical legal aid in relation to problems of discrimination,
particularly for racialized and aboriginal persons in criminal proceedings. As was
noted at the LAO consultation about this paper, the impact of conviction (perhaps
even without a prison sentence) for a young aboriginal person is devastating in terms
of subsequent limitations on life choices and opportunities. Similarly, Ewart argued
that the impact of discriminatory conduct on the individual must be taken into
account if legal aid is to address these systemic problems effectively; as he explained,
a black man arrested by the police and who faces a criminal charge:
need[s] a lawyer who ... can appreciate what it is like to be denied
opportunities because of your race, to be part of a frequently targeted
community, to have been frequently stopped and questioned by the
police, and to face a courtroom in which yours is the only black face
... [This approach] is not just helpful to improving client confidence
in the service being provided; it is vital for a variety of "traditional"
purposes [including obtaining all relevant evidence, preparing the
254
client to testify, etc].
252

Australia, Legal Aid Manual, supra note 87 at 7.

Hon. Beverley McLachlin, C.J.C., "The Challenges We Face" (Presentation to the Empire
Club of Canada, Toronto, 8 March 2007); (2007) 40 U.B.C. L. Rev. 819 at 826-827 (note also
the recent creation of a Woman's Court in Toronto, focusing on gender and addiction).
254 Ewart, supra note 1 at 15.
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In such contexts, a "legal categories" approach to priorities for legal aid services
may not respond effectively to the needs of particular kinds of clients: visible
minorities, Aboriginal persons, or individuals who are mentally ill, illiterate, or who
do not speak dominant languages. Moreover, more systemic approaches may offer
overall cost savings, by contrast with the repeated provision of individual legal aid
based on legal categories of entitlement.
Example #5: A third example was presented at the LAO consultation about this
paper. It concerns the "cascading" problem of an applicant who requests social
assistance, following relationship breakdown. The social assistance application
triggers a claim for child support, so that the Ministry of Community and Social
Services can obtain a contribution to the social assistance provided to the applicant,
even though the applicant obtains no benefit from the child support order. Yet,
because this process requires a court appearance (often funded by legal aid), it may
increase tensions within the separating family, possibly by creating another
"cascading" problem of custody and access litigation. Clearly, there is a need for a
systemic approach to the intersection of social assistance and legal aid; this problem
cannot be addressed by a legal categories approach.
A third limitation concerns problems with a "legal categories" approach when
legal aid funds are scarce or inadequate. In this context, the combination of a legal
categories approach and the fact that priority is accorded to the negative liberty
principle has regularly resulted in the allocation of more funding to criminal law
matters, leaving few (or no) legal aid funds available for family law and other civil
law matters.
The Blueprint report recommendation to remove the traditional emphasis on
negative liberty is reflected in the current statute, which leaves decisions about
priorities to the Board of LAO. Yet, according to the recent Trebilcock Report, there
has not been a significant shift in the allocation of legal aid resources from criminal
law representation to other legal aid needs. 255 The disproportionate allocation of legal
aid to criminal law cases is an important concern in a context in which LAO has a
significant responsibility for the distribution of public funds in a manner that
complies with Chartervalues of equality and non-discrimination.
Example #6: As numerous critics have pointed out, a disproportionate allocation of
legal aid to criminal law cases means that legal aid resources are directed much more
often to men (who are the primary users of criminal legal aid) than to women (who
are much more often the users of family legal aid services). As Patricia Hughes
argued forcefully, the effect of many current legal aid programs is that "women have
inferior access to their legal rights and lack the equal protection of the law, resulting

2 55

Trebilcock Report, supranote 7 at 76-77.
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in unequal benefit of other legally sanctioned protections."2 56 This situation also
denies women equality of access to government-provided services. A systemic
approach, based on fundamental values of equality and non-discrimination, requires
that this disparity between legal aid in criminal law cases and in family law
proceedings must be addressed.
Arguments about the need for legal aid in criminal cases frequently rely on the
inequality of power for an accused person where the other party is the state. Two
aspects of this problem are important:
Example #7: First, there are other circumstances in which the state is a party to the
proceedings, including refugee claims, committal proceedings for mental illness,
child protection matters, and social assistance hearings. If the argument is simply that
the state is a party, then these matters should also attract strong support for the
provision of legal aid, since the consequences of an adverse result are often just as
significant as imprisonment for an accused: deportation in the refugee case, detention
in a mental health facility with its loss of liberty, the loss of one's children in child
protection proceedings, and the loss of livelihood, including homelessness, in social
assistance cases. In addition, it is important to take account of the fact that the Crown
in a criminal case is obliged to act in the public interest, an obligation that extends
beyond the general requirements of lawyers' professional ethics. 257 This argument
suggests that there may be some family and civil law contexts in which the presence
of counsel is more necessary than in the criminal law context.
Example #8: Second, there are many situations in which the inequality of the parties
may be just as significant as in cases involving the state and an accused person. Thus,
if the need for legal aid is based on inequality of power between the parties, there will
be other situations that necessitate legal aid: a poor tenant who is challenging an
eviction notice from a major corporate landlord; or an employee who is challenging a
dismissal notice from a large corporate employer. In both cases, the resources of the
corporate landlord or corporate employer may substantially exceed those of the state
in criminal law matters.

Patricia Hughes, "The Gendered Nature of Legal Aid" in Frederick H. Zemans, Patrick
Monahan & Aneurin Thomas, eds., A New Legal Aid Planfor Ontario:Background Papers
(North York: York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy, 1997) 29 at 52; See
also Patricia Hughes, "Recognizing Substantive Equality as a Foundational Constitutional
Principle" (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 5; Mary Jane Mossman, "Gender Equality and Legal Aid
Services: A Research Agenda for Institutional Change" (1993) 15 Sydney L. Rev. 30; Mary
Jane Mossman, "Gender Equality, Family Law and Access to Justice" (1994) 8 International
Journal of Law and the Family 357.
257 Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of ProfessionalConduct, Rule 4.01(3):
Duty as
Prosecutor.
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Thus, the use of "legal categories" to determine legal aid priorities fails to take
account of particular circumstances of individuals' lives and the potential impact of
the legal problems they experience. In this situation, it is important to explore some
possible alternatives.
3. A "LEGAL NEEDS / SOCIAL EXCLUSION" APPROACH
This approach to research on justiciable problems views legal
problems and concepts of justice and of access to justice from the
point of view of the people who experience them. This perspective
locates access to justice in a broader policy framework than might be
customary. The provision of access to justice services can play a part
problems, but also a
not only in alleviating or preventing justiciable
258
broader range of social and health problems.
Increasing interest in the United Kingdom, and also in Canada, in research
identifying "justiciable problems" and how they "cluster" or "cascade" provides
some useful information about how people actually experience the need for legal
services, including legal aid. This research is also valuable in demonstrating how
some problems may "trigger" additional legal and social problems. As the United
Kingdom research suggested, patterns in the clusters of problems "show clearly that
people experience ... linked and mutually reinforcing problems", and that these
patterns are found not only among low-income and socially excluded groups but also
for those who are more affluent. 259 In this context, some researchers have suggested
that "[e]arly and appropriate advice and action in relation to one problem might
prevent individuals from going on to experience multiple problems and consequently
becoming more vulnerable to 'social exclusion'; they also argued that this
information about how justiciable problems may cluster or cascade could be used to
develop diagnostic tools for advice providers and to identify vulnerable populations
260
for whom "joined-up" or integrated legal and social services might be designed.
In thinking about priorities for legal aid services, it is important to unpack these
suggestions.
LEGAL ADVICE FOR THE PUBLIC

Governmental and legal aid policies in the United Kingdom have increasingly
focused on the need to expand advice services at an early stage so as to avert more
serious and multiple problems from occurring; and there have been some good efforts
to create better links and coordination among advice providers. At the same time, it
seems likely that advice will often be more helpful to those who are less vulnerable
258 Currie, supra note
259

49 at 34.
Pleasence et al., "Multiple Justiciable Problems", supra note 133; Pleasence, "Causes of
Action", supra note 125.
260 Pleasence et al., "Multiple Justiciable Problems", ibid. at 326.
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individuals or groups, by contrast with those who have problems with literacy,
language, mental or ill health, or cultural or geographic isolation. To repeat Lynn
Mather's critique, self-help is not a panacea: "for some
2 6 1 people and some problems,
self-help suggests abandonment, not empowerment."
Thus, if the Trebilcock Report is correct in concluding that more emphasis on
legal advice for middle class persons would enhance political support for legal aid
services in Ontario, it seems that this recommendation, like the trend in the United
Kingdom, to promote advice services could divert scarce resources from individuals
and communities who are the most vulnerable and disadvantaged. 262 In this way, a
focus on legal needs and social exclusion in designing priorities for legal aid services
suggests that the goal of enhancing middle class support for legal aid should be
accomplished with additional funding, rather than the diversion of existing scarce
legal aid funds for the clients and communities served by community clinics.
In addition, as was argued earlier in this paper, there is some evidence in the
United Kingdom that the provision of enhanced and coordinated legal advice may
also lead to a conclusion that those who do not avail themselves of such services are
to "blame" for their problems of social exclusion. In this way, initiatives responding
to the problems of legal needs and social exclusion - by the provision of legal advice
- need to be monitored carefully.
Suggestions in the United Kingdom research with respect to using data about
justiciable problems to develop diagnostic tools for advice providers, and in
identifying vulnerable populations for whom more integrated legal and social
services may be needed, may further enhance legal aid for existing client
communities. By contrast with the United Kingdom, community legal clinics in
Ontario already have sophisticated data about how legal problems may cluster or
cascade for poor clients in relation to issues of social assistance, rental and lowincome housing, immigration status, mental or physical dis/ability and
discrimination; and many clinics have already developed specialized diagnostic tools
and coordinated services to meet the breadth and variety of problems facing their
clients.
Yet, while the Trebilcock Report noted the existence of a number of "integrated
263
service" agencies in Ontario, which offer legal and other services in one location,
the report failed to document how community clinics regularly provide referrals to
other agencies, and how often they initiate and support liaison relationships with
other service providers for purposes of follow up.264 Indeed, a fundamental rationale
for the creation of community clinics was a recognition of the need for holistic legal
services, a feature that has tended to be overlooked, both in the Trebilcock Report
Moorhead & Pleasence, "Access to Justice", supra note 51 at 8.
Trebilcock, supra note 7 at 77-79, 81-82.
263 Ibid. at 104-107.
264 See Michele Leering, "Community Legal Clinics of Ontario: Promising Practices"
(Presentation at the International Legal Aid Group Conference, Wellington NZ, 1-3 April
2009).
261

262
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and in other initiatives of LAO. Clearly, there is clinic expertise that could be much
more widely utilized in defining legal needs and overcoming social exclusion.
Example #9: The Ontario Civil Legal Needs Project, designed to understand the civil
legal needs of low and middle-income Ontarians, has representation from the Law
Society, Pro Bono Law Ontario, and LAO. 2 65 In addition, however, this Project
would benefit from direct input from community legal clinics; clinics might also be
represented on the Project's executive committee and provide advice with respect to
the methodology of surveys, the organization of focus groups, and the mapping of
problems with access to justice - particularly with respect to the most vulnerable and
disadvantaged Ontarians.
LEGAL AID AND CLIENT IMPACT
Priorities for legal aid based on "legal needs / social exclusion," like the "legal
categories" approach, focuses primarily on legal representation. By contrast with the
"legal categories" approach, however, the "legal needs and social exclusion"
approach requires an assessment of the impact of failure to provide services in terms
of the individual's legal and social circumstances.
Example #10: The example in the Blueprint report concerning the needs of a first
offender for whom conviction will have serious life consequences, by contrast with a
repeat offender who is not particularly troubled about a jail sentence, offers one
example of the operation of this approach to priorities. It focuses attention on
assessing the needs and circumstances of individual applicants, not just the category
of offence with which the accused is charged.
Example #11: The American Bar Association suggested another example of this
approach to priorities. The ABA argued that the test for determining a need for
counsel should be "whether it can be honestly said the litigant can obtain a fair
hearing without being represented by a lawyer., 266 In applying this test, the ABA
defined criteria to be considered, suggesting that a lawyer's representation would not
be required only if several criteria were all met: the law and procedures are simple,
the other side is not represented, both parties have intellectual, language, and other
skills to enable their effective participation, and the judge assumes a responsibility
for identifying the relevant facts and legal principles.267 As an American judge
argued, the test for legal aid representation in family law matters, outlined in Lassiter
(similar to the G. (J). test in Canada) should be applied "honestly - the words of that
The Law Society of Upper Canada, News Release, "Ontario Civil Legal Needs Project"
(15 January 2009), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/latest-news/a/ontario-civil-legalneeds-project/>.
266
ABA Report, supra note 65 at 14.
267 Ibid.
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test as they would be understood by almost anyone in this society, lawyer or
layperson ... If you do, you will find a constitutional right to counsel in civil
cases."' 26 8 Clearly, this approach to priorities focuses on "legal needs / social
exclusion" in relation to the impact on a client, not just a legal category of
entitlement, in determining whether legal aid should be provided.
Thus, the "legal needs and social exclusion" approach to legal aid priorities
would necessitate an assessment of the potential impact of a negative outcome on the
legal aid applicant, having regard to individual circumstances in relation to the legal
problem. Although this approach requires a different kind of assessment of legal aid
applications, by contrast with the "legal categories" approach, it is possible to
identify checklists of criteria to be assessed pursuant to this approach.
The Australian approach to legal aid priorities offers one way of taking account
of legal needs and social exclusion in practice. Although the Guidelines define
Priorities initially in terms of legal categories, they also require assessment of
"special circumstances": language or literacy problems, intellectual or dis/ability
(physical or psychiatric) challenges, geographic isolation, a likelihood of domestic
violence in family law matters, etc. 269 In this way, the Australian Priorities combine a
"legal categories" approach with a modified "legal needs / social exclusion"
approach. Moreover, because the Guidelines also require both a "means test" and a
"merits test," the public interest aspect of providing legal aid is also addressed
explicitly in determining entitlement. This requirement recognizes, as Ewart noted,
that the provision of representation to one applicant means the denial of service to
another; thus, a "legal needs / social exclusion" approach, in addition to "legal
categories," may both structure the exercise of discretion and take into account the
public interest.
By contrast with an approach that combines "legal categories" and "legal needs /
social exclusion," it is important to assess the merits of using only a "legal needs /
social exclusion" approach:
One advantage is that all legal aid needs will then be treated equally in the
assessment process, and this process can take a more holistic view of the nature of
the problem in relation to the needs of the applicant, rather than first requiring a
determination as to whether the claim fits a particular legal category. In this way,
eliminating legal categories might better achieve an effective focus on client needs.
Second, an approach based on "legal needs / social exclusion," rather than on
legal categories, may prove more flexible in responding to new or changing needs for
Earl Johnson Jr., "Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United
States and Other Industrial Democracies" (2000-2001) 24 Fordham Int'l L. J. S83 at S102;
See also G. (J.),supra note 162 (this comment reflects the difference between Lamer, C.J.'s
comments in the majority decision in G. (J),by contrast with those of L'Heureux-Dube, J. in
her concurring decision, with respect to how often the test would require provision of statefunded counsel in child protection cases).
269 Australia, Legal Aid Manual, supra note 87 at 7.
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legal aid. Clearly, sophisticated monitoring and evaluation processes will be required
to document how requests for legal aid have been met, or not; but this data may more
accurately reflect client needs, since there will be no presumptions about
"categorical" entitlement or disentitlement.
Finally, it is arguable that an approach to priorities based on "legal needs / social
exclusion" may result in much greater creativity in delivery systems, so as to meet
these client needs effectively and efficiently. By contrast, legal aid priorities based on
"legal categories" may tend to reflect existing legal services and service providers in
particular areas of law.
Example #12: Consider, for example, how the provision of criminal law
representation might be designed for accused persons suffering from mental health
problems, if the focus were on the needs of these clients who have come into contact
with the criminal law system as a result of their dis/ability? Such a focus could result
in a need to decriminalize some behaviours, to develop better community support, to
create specialized court or tribunal processes to respond to these needs, or other
solutions.
In this context, it is important to examine an approach to legal aid priorities
based on "legal needs / social exclusion" per se. Although it might also be combined,
as in the Australian model, with a "legal categories" approach, a primary focus on
needs rather than categories may permit much greater creativity in defining priorities
for legal aid.
Yet, as many of these examples suggest, both the legal categories approach and
the "legal needs / social exclusion" approach focus on the provision of services, and
primarily services to individuals. Thus, neither of these approaches really addresses
the systemic needs of those who are poor, disadvantaged and vulnerable for many
different kinds of reasons.
Example #13: The need for legal aid to engage proactively in confronting systemic
problems experienced by individuals has not attracted as much attention as legal aid
services to individuals. 27 Yet, as Shelley Gavigan pointed out so poignantly, a
"successful case" on behalf of a welfare mother, or a tenant who is threatened with
eviction, results in one client who is still a welfare mother and another who is still a
day. Both of them are still poor and vulnerable,
(low-income) tenant at the end of the
• ,271
reoccur.
will
aid
legal
and their need for
Sommerlad, "'I've lost the plot"', supra note 186.
Shelley A.M. Gavigan, "Poverty Law, Theory, and Practice: The Place of Class and
Gender in Access to Justice" in Elizabeth Cormack, ed., Locating Law.
Race/Class/Gender/SexualityConnections (Winnipeg: Femwood Publishing, 1999) 208 at
221; See also Laureen Snider, "Legal Aid, Reform, and the Welfare State" in Stephen Brickey
270
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& Elizabeth Comack, eds., The Social Basis ofLaw. CriticalReadings in the Sociology of

Law (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1986) 169.
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4. A "SOCIAL INCLUSION / SYSTEMIC" APPROACH
The concept [of social inclusion] goes beyond the description of
deprivation to focus on the social relations and the processes and
institutions that underlie it. This can represent a shift away from
looking at deprivation in terms of individual attributes, and towards a
focus on mechanisms, institutions and actors that are responsible for
the deprivation. That 27is,2 it explicitly makes possible a discussion of
power and inequality.
In promoting goals of "social inclusion", Mitchell and Shillington identified five
critical dimensions for promoting social inclusion. They are:
[c]onferring recognition ...
on individuals and groups including
recogni[tion of] common worth through universal programs such as
health care[;]
[n]urturing the talents, skills, capacities and choices of children
and adults to live a life they value and to make a contribution both
they and others find worthwhile[;]
XII.
[h]aving the right and the necessary support to
make/be involved in decisions affecting oneself, family and
community, and to be engaged in community lifes[;]
XIII.
[s]haring physical and social spaces to provide
opportunities for interactions ...and to reduce social distances
between people ... , includ[ing] shared public spaces such as parks
and libraries [; and]
XIV.
[h]aving the material resources to 2allow
children and
73
their parents to participate fully in community life
As these dimensions of "social inclusion" make clear, the concept reflects
individuals in communities, with opportunities • and274 capacity for meaningful
Relying on the work of
participation, not simply increased levels of income.
Amartya Sen, and his recognition of the importance of promoting "individual
capabilities", 275 Mitchell and Shillington argue that "social inclusion" means "the
difference between being a consumer and being a citizen. What is needed are
[systemic] policies that promote people's capacities to act as citizens with equal
freedom to conduct a life they have reason to value."
Mitchell & Shillington, supra note 221 at 10.
Ibid at ix.
274 See also ibid at 15 (the authors emphasized the limits to inclusion through work, arguing
that recent declines in the level of unemployment have had no appreciable impact on levels of
poverty).
275 Sen, "Social Exclusion", supra note 129 at 32.
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LEGAL AID AND "SOCIAL INCLUSION"

Legal aid priorities based on "social inclusion" are similar to priorities based on
"legal needs / social exclusion" in that both are grounded in individuals' experiences
of inequality and disadvantage. However, when priorities focus on goals of social
inclusion, they directly focus on identifying the systems and practices that create
poverty, vulnerability and inequality, and on structures and policies for changing
them.
A first step in implementing a "social inclusion" approach to legal aid priorities
is to collect information about the ways in which existing systems and practices
contribute to producing poverty, vulnerability and inequality, including those of
governments, social systems, and law and legal processes. At least to some extent,
this approach responds to Macdonald's observation that collecting data is not enough;
276
one needs a theory to interpret the data.
However, information needed for a social inclusion approach differs from recent
research undertaken concerning justiciable problems, because a social inclusion
approach is designed to understand the legal and social contexts which create
justiciable problems, it is not primarily focused on identifying "problems" and the
vulnerable people who experience them. 2 77 Moreover, it is clear that community
legal clinics in Ontario already have much of this information available because of
their efforts to create systemic solutions for individual and community problems. In
addition, there are government reports, commissions of inquiry, and studies
undertaken by anti-poverty and other advocacy groups to augment this information.
A social inclusion approach to legal aid priorities reflects a transformative
perspective on access to justice, one that requires fundamental questioning of existing
practices and systems that contribute to systemic problems of poverty, vulnerability
and inequality. Such an approach would allocate priorities so as to combat these
conditions. In this way, it is similar to Ewart's suggestion that legal aid services
should respond to "the huge systemic problems of poverty and discrimination as
themselves contributing to involvement with the criminal, civil, administrative and
family law systems, and ...
use legal
and other resources to reduce the impact of
2 78
poor."
the
of
lives
the
on
poverty
Example #14: Although this approach does not preclude a case by case approach,
Ewart suggested that there could be other ways to address systemic problems: test
cases, negotiations with police, landlords, or local welfare administrators, law reform
activities on behalf of a group of affected persons, or legal interventions in cases.
More specifically, to implement such a program successfully, legal aid
administrators must be knowledgeable about the circumstances of their clients' lives

276 Macdonald,

"Scope, Scale, and Ambitions", supra note 23 at 103.
See Curran & Noone, supra note 201.
278 Ewart, supra note 1 at 16.
277
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and be able to assess where the law is "hurting the most" or where it might be
developed to help.
Example #15: In the criminal law context, for example, a social inclusion approach
to legal aid priorities might challenge government criminalization strategies or
reliance on incarceration as a primary strategy for punishment; it might rethink the
role of counsel in cases involving accused persons with mental health issues in ways
that respond to an accused's problems beyond the criminal charge; it might consider
proposing alternatives to conviction for first offences on the part of aboriginal or
racialized accused persons in circumstances where such convictions may "trigger"
ongoing social and legal problems.
Legal aid initiatives that utilize priorities of social inclusion may involve a
combination of strategies, including the provision of general advice as well as
educational programs, support for lobbying efforts related to reforms of the justice
system, and test case litigation. Such efforts can mobilize communities to seek
279
systemic changes to confront the problems of poverty, vulnerability and inequality.
Moreover, while Charter values may provide some direction with respect to
systemic issues for legal aid priorities, a "social inclusion" approach to legal aid
priorities should not be limited only to Charterrequirements. In addition, the "social
inclusion" approach can exercise creativity in methods of delivery that use scarce
funds efficiently.
Example #16: For example, Ewart argued that "the choice may not have to be
between bail representation and divorce, but can be exercised in favour of an
economical way of meeting bail representation needs, with the savings producing
enough funding to support divorce representation, perhaps provided that the
government could be persuaded to streamline that
process in a way which reduced
' 280
the amount and cost of the legal work it required."
In this way, a social inclusion approach to legal aid priorities recognizes the
fundamental role of legal aid in fostering the goal of substantive and equal justice for
poor and vulnerable persons in our community. In doing so, it is essential to
understand legal aid in terms of initiatives that confront systemic problems of
inequality within the justice system, and their relationship to other problems of
exclusion in society. Responding to these problems, using a social inclusion
approach, would best enable the creation of holistic legal aid services.

279 Mosher, "Welfare
280 Ewart, supra note

Reform", supra note 218 at 119.
1 at 20.
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5. CONCLUSION:

LAO'S PROACTIVE ROLE AND IDEAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND
EXPERIMENTATION

[M]anagement of the legal aid system cannot be approached in
isolation from the broader justice system and must be viewed as an
integral part of a broader strategy of progressive and incremental
reform of the justice system at large. Legal aid resources should be
expended in ways that facilitate more timely and more effective
resolution of disputes. In turn, reforms to the broaderjustice system
must also be pursued thatfacilitatethis objective.281
This statement was the first of seven concluding themes of the Trebilcock
Report. 2 82 Its significance lies in its recognition of legal aid as an integral part of the
overall justice system, and of the need for Legal Aid Ontario to take a proactive role
in seeking ways to improve justice in Ontario in order to discharge its fundamental
responsibility for effective legal aid policies. As this paper also suggests, LAO has
robust and unique roles in the context of governmental measures intended to
ameliorate the legal and social problems of the poorest, and most vulnerable and
disadvantaged members of our communities: in Ontario, LAO has been designated
the "lead agency" for the provision of advice, information and representation.
Recognizing that resources are always scarce, this paper suggests a number of
opportunities for LAO to ensure that funds are used in ways that grapple with needed
reforms to the overall justice system, that target individual needs using effective
methods of delivery, and that engage with systemic problems of legal and social
inequality to enable all residents of Ontario to have the benefits of the rule of law and
of meaningful and democratic participation in our communities.
SYSTEMIC APPROACHES TO LEGAL AID PRIORITIES

Understanding the needs of Ontarians for legal aid requires a broad conception
of the role of law, and the ways in which members of the public come into contact
with it, in order to respond effectively with scarce resources. Clearly, an approach
which simply identifies legal categories of entitlement is not using legal aid funds
prudently, since some recipients of categorical legal aid will not have significant
needs, while others who are not so entitled may have very great needs. Thus, a
categorical approach may be both over- and under-inclusive in relation to need.
Report, supra note 7 at 177 [emphasis added].
Others included raising financial eligibility criteria, providing some services without
means-testing, overcoming the "silo" approach by better integrating legal and other services,
experimenting with innovative forms of service delivery, increasing the tariff and the salaries
of duty counsel and clinic lawyers, and the infusion of additional funding for legal aid to
overcome chronic under-funding problems.
281 Trebilcock

282
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In this context, it is critical to look at legal processes from a systemic
perspective: how might they be designed to work more holistically and more
effectively? What kinds of system changes could ensure more justice from law and
legal processes? How might different personnel, different procedures, and different
kinds of solutions enable the justice system, and legal aid as an integral part of it, to
work more effectively? And how can LAO redesign its priorities to accomplish these
goals?
Moreover, although a "legal needs / social exclusion" approach to priorities will
provide some assistance, a systemic approach will necessitate serious consideration
of a "social inclusion" approach to priorities for legal aid. What kinds of specific
actions might the Board of LAO recommend at this point? Although there is bound to
be much debate about these matters, a number of suggestions, derived from the
literature and raised at the LAO consultation on this paper seem to be particularly
compelling:
Example #17: Bail proceedings As noted at the LAO consultation on this paper,
there are significant problems with current processes for bail decisions, such that
many accused persons consent to release with inappropriate conditions, sometimes on
the advice of Duty Counsel. Since the ultimate outcome of a criminal proceeding ...
may be strongly affected by an initial bail decision, it seems critical to change the
culture relating to legal processes for determining bail decisions. Indeed, it seems that
decisions of the Superior Court on bail reviews confirm these concerns. Dealing with
the bail issue as a systemic matter might thus alleviate difficulties for accused
persons, and also ensure that funding for bail hearings is utilized more effectively, in
the context of criminal proceedings more generally.
Example #18: Community courts In addition, the development of "community
courts" in New Zealand and in British Columbia, suggest an important way of
thinking about access to justice for particular kinds of communities. The recent
introduction in Toronto of a criminal court for women with problems of addiction or
alcoholism may be one example, and the well-established Gladue courts are another.
To the extent that community courts can offer specialized procedures and perhaps
different forms of sentencing, they may respond more successfully to the "special
circumstances" of individual clients. Significantly, this kind of initiative represents a
systemic response that still responds to individual problems.
Example #19: Family law proceedings Similarly, the LAO consultation on this paper
identified how applications for welfare result in proceedings relating to child support
in the Ontario Court of Justice; and sometimes then escalate into custody/access
disputes. In addition to these family law issues, however, there are significant
systemic problems with the operation of family law proceedings related to both
separation and divorce. The complexity of the statutory framework, in a context in
which more than 40% of marriages end in dissolution, a statistic that does not include
cohabiting relationships that similarly end in dissolution, means that many Ontarians
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must confront the justice system in family law matters. Although this issue does not
affect only legal aid clients, there are clearly problems that result from high rates of
unrepresented clients, at least some of whom have not been able to obtain legal aid.
In this context, careful attention to the reviews of the Family Law Offices, and the
special efforts on the part of the Toronto office to deal with client "needs" deserve to
be examined more carefully: to what extent did the efforts of the Toronto office
ensure that its clients did not experience additional legal problems, an issue that
directly engages the longer term, not merely the immediate issues, in legal services?
In addition, it may be important for LAO to examine the Australian research that
suggests that early legal advice and intervention may be more cost-effective in the
long run than ADR processes.
Example #20: Further research about Australian approaches The LAO consultation
queried the application in practice of the Australian system of Priorities (including
"special circumstances") and Guidelines (including the "means test" and "merits
test," which invoke the public interest). Although it appears that these criteria have
not been used to alter the general approach to legal aid in Australia, these concepts
nonetheless warrant further examination by the LAO Board: how might they be
deployed to target needs more specifically?
Example #21: Information, advice and technology The review undertaken in this
paper suggests caution with respect to a significant emphasis on the provision of legal
information and advice to the public, particularly with respect to enhanced
arrangements for technology. The United States experience suggests that clients with
some education, literacy, language and other skills may be able to utilize quite
successfully legal websites, interactive computer fora, and other kinds of
technological developments. However, the most vulnerable and disadvantaged will
not be able to do so effectively. In this context, it is necessary to be strategic,
particularly when funding is scarce, and to ensure that any information or advice
programs are clearly responding to a range of clients, particularly those experiencing
the effect of systemic problems.
More specifically, LAO needs to take seriously the decades of experiences in
community legal clinics, which have regularly provided information and advice to
target populations and in relation to systemic problems: there is no need to "reinvent
the wheel." By contrast, if LAO wishes to confront the legal problems of the middleclass, it is strongly suggested that the LAO mandate to provide legal aid to the poor
necessitates an additionalinjection of funding for this purpose. To be blunt, to divert
scarce legal resources from the poorest and most vulnerable communities to provide
legal information and advice to the middle class would be unconscionable.
Example #22: Civil Legal Needs Project There is also a need for LAO to promote
significant involvement on the part of community legal clinics in the Ontario Civil
Legal Needs Project. Both in the design process for surveys, and in the development
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of focus groups, it is critical to ensure that poor and vulnerable Ontarians are
included. Both the "justiciable needs" studies in the United Kingdom and studies of
legal needs in Ontario in the 1980s have often reflected legal problems encountered
by the middle class; in this context, to the extent that LAO has a primary
responsibility for ensuring access to justice for the poor, there is a responsibility to
ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable Ontarians are included. Indeed, as noted
above, the Project would be much enhanced if LAO included clinic representation on
its executive committee.
Example #23: Governmental program for poverty reduction The LAO consultation
also identified a role for legal aid in the newly-established poverty reduction strategy
of the provincial government. In this context, LAO needs to harness the expertise and
experience of community clinics to determine the extent to which legal problems are
related to poverty. The example discussed at the consultation about the ways in
which social assistance rules drive people into poverty and make it harder to escape a
permanent poverty status represents only one issue that might well be addressed as
part of this governmental initiative. Significantly, it may also be important to
consider how family dissolution contributes to poverty, an issue that might be
considered by the Family Law Offices. In addition, however, there are also issues
about housing problems, mental and physical dis/ability problems, race and gender
issues, the lack of status for refugees or immigrants, or employment and
unemployment issues in the current recession. In the context of a significant poverty
reduction program of the provincial government, LAO has a major opportunity, and a
significant responsibility, to provide information and recommendations. This is a
matter for which the community clinics and the Family Law Offices are well-situated
to provide leadership and recommendations.
Clearly, these suggestions require further discussion, analysis, research and
opportunities for experimentation and evaluation.
In this context, this paper was presented to the LAO and its Board with the
intent to encourage a broad view of LAO's responsibility to promote access to
justice, equality before the law, and a sense of "social inclusion" for the poorest and
most vulnerable members of our community.

